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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to §78-2a-3(j) of the Utah Code 
Annotated (1953) and pursuant to Rules 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1- Did the lower Court err in ruling that the Notice of Interest recorded by 
Birch (Plaintiff and Appellant) was a wrongful lien. 
Standard of Review: Correction of Error and Abuse of Discretion. 
State
 v. Pena, 869 P.2d. 932 (Utah 1994); Kunceler v. O'Dell, 855 P.2d. 270 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 860 P.2d. 937 (Utah 
1993); Horton v. Carter, 970 P.2d. 254 (Utah 1998). 
Issue preserved in lower court by order granting the1 wrongful Hen on April 2, 2008 
(R. 676) and Motion for Reconsideration filed November 15, 2007 (R. 365-372). 
2. DM the lower Court err in failing to rufe that the Petition pursuant to the 
wrongful lien statute was signed and filed by an attorney and not by the 
Petitioner, Bernard J. Myers. 
Standard of Review: Correction of Error. 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d. 932 (Utah 1994). 
Issue preserved in lower court by order granting Pe|tition for Wrongful Lien (R. 
676) filed April 2, 2008. 
3. Did the lower Court err in refusing to allow the testimony of Nurse Dee 
Horn and Social Worker Heather Bittinger. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of Discretion. 
l 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d. 932 (Utah 1994); Gerbich v. Nurnedlnc, 977 P.2d 1205 
(Utah 1999). 
Issue preserved in lower court by testimony and sustaining an objection. 
4. Did the lower Court err in denying the Birch Motion to Dismiss based 
upon lack of subject matter, lack of jurisdiction. 
Standard of Review: Correction of Error. 
S.S. v. State, 972 P.2d. 439 (Utah 1998). 
Issue preserved in lower court by Findings and Judgment (R. 683-688). 
5. Did the lower Court err in overturning the stipulation and order of the 
Court providing for the sale of the Blackhawk property and disposition of 
the sale proceeds. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of Discretion and Correction of Error. 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d. 932 (Utah 1994). 
Issue preserved in lower court by Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Order dated April 21, 2008 (R.686). 
6. Did the lower Court err in failing to transfer the Blackhawk property to 
the Birch's after it was vacated and abandoned by Bernard J. Myers.1 
Standard of Review: Correction of Error. 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d. 932 (Utah 1994). 
Issue preserved in lower court by Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 
686). 
1
 Although not part of this record, we learned from a letter from counsel, Kent B. Alderman, that the Blackhawk 
Property had been sold; the whereabouts of the proceeds of sale are unknown. 
2 
7. Did the lower Court err in failing to compel Myers to return $7,516.72 he 
took from the accounts of Eva L. Myers. 
Standard of Review: Correction of Error. 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d. 932 (Utah 1994). 
Issue preserved in lower court by the record (Tr. 39^). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE, MARSHALLING AND FACTS 
Bernard J. Myers and Eva L. Myers were married late in life on July 7, 1998 
approximately 9 years before May, 2007 (R. 29). Eva Myers died on the 29th day of May, 
2007. 
Before the marriage, Eva L. Myers owned and fully paid for a residence located at 
3598 Black Hawk Drive, West Valley City, Salt Lake County, Utah. After the marriage, 
this is where the two parties lived (Tr. 266-267). 
Bernard J. Myers gave the home he owned to his son Gary Myers. 
For some unknown reason except possibly a solicitation made through a senior 
citizen center the couple employed counsel for the purpose of forming a Revocable Trust. 
A copy of this trust is in the pleadings (R. 64-90). The trust was executed on the 29th day 
of November, 2005 (R.100). 
On the day the trust was executed Eva L. Myers executed and recorded a Warranty 
Deed conveying the Blackhawk property to the Bernard J. Myers and Eva L. Myers 
Revocable Living Trust. 
No other assets of any kind were ever placed in the trust although the couple did 
establish a type of trust account with Chase Bank. The parties were careful to label each 
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account that each owned with a single name. However, it was never agreed that any asset 
would go into the trust and that the trust accounts would remain the separate property of 
the party whose assets were in the separate accounts. 
Eva L. Myers was diagnosed with cancer in about January 2007 at the Huntsman 
Cancer Institute in Salt Lake City, Utah and was treated there for several months. 
However, the cancer was terminal and she died at home on the 29 day of May, 2007. 
On July 27, 2007, Bernard J. Myers filed a petition for appointment of himself as 
Personal Representative of the Estate of Eva L. Myers. 
On August 15, 2007, Allan G. Birch, Glenn L. Birch and James Birch filed an 
objection to the Petition for Appointment and cited in objection that Bernard J. Myers was 
not competent. This was supported by the Affidavits of Dee Horn, R.N. and Heather 
Bittinger, CSW (Addendum land 2). 
Under the procedures of the Third District Court, when an objection to appoint is 
filed the matter is referred to the trial court and that is what occurred in this case. 
During July 2007, the Birch's learned that Bernard J. Myers had vacated the 
Blackhawk residence of Eva L. Myers and was living elsewhere. They further learned 
that Bernard J. Myers had listed the Blackhawk property for sale. The plaintiffs then 
recorded a Notice of Interest with the Salt Lake County Recorders Office to protect their 
beneficial interest in the trust. On September 26, 2007 counsel for Bernard J. Myers filed 
a so-called Petition to cancel and annul the Notice of Interest. A response to that petition 
was filed on October 11, 2007. Although the lower court held hearings on the matter, it 
4 
was not finally determined until the final Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Order were filed on April 22, 2008. 
On September 27, 2007, Birch filed a Complaint in Third District Court seeking to 
remove Myers as trustee of the Revocable Trust; enjoin Bernard J. Myers real estate agent 
by continuing efforts to sale the Blackhawk Property and for conversion of the 
Blackhawk property. This action was later consolidated into the probate case. 
On November 20, 2007, Birch' filed a Motion to Dismiss the probate petition 
based upon the fact that there were no probate assets. The Court dismissed this motion 
without prejudice allowing time for Bernard J. Myers to declare assets. No assets were 
mentioned, but nonetheless, the Court dismissed the motion at the time of trial even 
though Bernard J. Myers had not produced or otherwise listed probate assets. 
MARSHALLING THE EVIDENCE 
The controverted facts developed in this case at this point in time point only to the 
issue of the mental competence of Bernard J. Myers. 
Evidence presented by Bernard J. Myers as to his competency consisted largely of 
the testimony of his family doctor (Tr. 126-133). Margaret F. Lunt is a physician that has 
practiced medicine for 9 years. She first became acquainted with Bernard J. Myers in 
1999 and saw him 2, 3, 4 times a year for the last 8 or 9 years. He keeps his 
appointments, knows how to take his own medication and can process information. In the 
fall of 2007 she did a mental competency evaluation of Bernard J. Myers (minie mental 
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status) and in her opinion he did not show signs of dementia based on the screening test. 
Her opinion was that he did not meet the criteria for mental impairment. 
She practices internal medicine and not psychiatry. 
She testified that the mental test took approximately ten minutes and there was 
nothing on the test to indicate whether the person could balance a checkbook or read a 
financial statement but that he could hire a lawyer or a realtor if he didn't understand 
documents or statements (Tr. 137). He was competent in her opinion. 
The competency of Bernard J. Myers is put at issue by the testimony of the three 
Birch brothers and the testimony of Nurse Dee Horn and Social Worker Heather Bittinger 
(Tr. 2796) and Bernard J. Myers, himself. The Court would not allow Nurse Horn or 
social worker Bittinger to give their opinion as to the competency of Myers. Therefore, 
the testimony was proffered to the Court. This included their Affidavits (R. 20 and R. 
23). Even if they were considered to be lay witnesses, their testimony should have been 
received. State v. Rothlisberger, 147 P.3d 1176 (Utah 2006): 
Tfl 1 In this case, we consider three types of testimony: 
lay fact testimony, lay opinion testimony, and expert 
testimony. Lay fact testimony, which is not directly addressed 
by rule 701 or 702, is factual testimony not based on 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.(fn6) Lay 
opinion testimony, which is treated under rule 701, is opinion 
or inference testimony not based on scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge.(fn7) Expert testimony, which is 
treated under rule 702, is opinion or fact testimony based on 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. (fn8). 
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The case was tried to the Court and not by a jury. TJie findings and conclusions of 
law relative to the alleged wrongful lien attached as Addendum 3 (R. 678) and the 
findings and conclusions of law granting Bernard J. Myers Petition for Appointment etc. 
amending the prior order of the court destroyed the stipulation of the parties concerning 
the sale of the Blackhawk property and the disbursement of the proceeds (R. 683). These 
findings are attached as Addendum 4. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. In 2008 the legislature amended the wrongful li$n statutes and specifically 
provided that the statute does not apply to "Notices of Intejrest". The ruling of the lower 
Court in this case is subject to that statute and its ruling th&t the Notice of Interest was a 
wrongful lien must be reversed. Further, the Petition for Wrongful Lien is faulty as not 
being signed by an interest holder and served upon the claimant. Further, the "Notice of 
Interest" has been excepted from the statute. 
2. The lower Court in this case ordered mediation.i The parties agreed that former 
Justice Gordon Hall would be the mediator. The initial mediation did not result in a 
conclusion of this litigation. However, shortly after the mediation, Justice Hall suggested 
a solution of the case, namely, that the Blackhawk property be sold and the net proceeds 
of the sale be deposited into a special account to be withdrawn only upon the signature of 
Gary Myers (son of Bernard J. Myers) and Allan G. Bircl^  and then only if an amount be 
needed for the care of Bernard J. Myers. This proposal wfts agreed to by all parties by 
stipulation and verbally submitted to the Court. After the|hearing, the Court signed the 
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Order on March 3, 2008 (R. 493-185) wherein the Court Ordered the Blackhawk property 
be sold and the proceeds deposited in a special account not to be withdrawn except upon a 
joint stipulation of the parties or further ordered of the Court for the benefit of Bernard J. 
Myers. Then on the 21st day of April, 2008 following the trial of the action, the Court 
amended its prior Order concerning the proceeds of sale and ordered that the proceeds be 
paid to Bernard J. Myers as Trustee of the trust, to be administered pursuant to the terms 
of the trust. This was error for the Court because it nullified the Stipulation of the parties 
and was made without any evidence being taken. This was an arbitrary and groundless 
decision (R.686). 
3. The Court erred in dismissing the Birch's Complaint against Bernard J. Myers, 
individually and as trustee (R. 686). 
4. The Court erred in failing to award the Birch's the Blackhawk Property 
pursuant to their Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 627-637, 686). 
5. The Court erred in failing to transfer the Blackhawk Property to the Birch's 
(684). 
6. The Court erred in denying the Birch Motion to Dismiss on the Petition to for 
Appointment of Personal Representative. 
7. The Court erred in not compelling Myers to return $7,516.72 he took from the 
accounts of Eva L. Myers (Tr. 397). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE 
"NOTICE OF INTEREST" RECORDED BY THE BIRCH'S WAS A WRONGFUL 
LIEN. 
Following the death of Eva L. Myers, Bernard J. Myers, or those acting for him, 
employed the services of a real estate broker for the purpose of selling the Blackhawk 
property. 
When Myers and the real estate agent refused to delist in the effort to sale and 
indicated that they fully intended to sale the property, Allan G. Birch filed a "Notice of 
Interest in Real Property" with the Salt Lake County Recorder (Addendum 5) (R. 262). 
This filing prompted Myers or his attorney to file a Petition to Nullify Wrongful 
Lien (R. 131-210). The petition for wrongful lien (R. 211-213) was not signed by the 
Petitioner Bernard J. Myers, but rather is signed by Matthdw Cook, one of the attorneys 
representing Bernard J. Myers. §38-9-7 states: 
(1) Any record interest holder of real property against 
which a wrongful lien as defined in Section 38-9-1 has been 
recorded may petition the district court in the county in which 
the document was recorded for summary relief to nullify the 
lien. 
(2) The petition shall state with specificity the claim 
that the lien is a wrongful lien and shall be supported by a 
sworn affidavit of the record interest holder. 
The statute is clear and its provisions unmistakable. The petition must be signed 
by the record interest holder of real property. 
The record interest holder did not sign the petition ^nd did not verify the same by 
Affidavit. 
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The statute further provides: 
(3)(c) The record interest holder shall serve a copy of 
the petition on the lien claimant and a notice of the hearing 
pursuant to Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4, Process. 
The Notice of Wrongful Lien was never served upon Allan G. Birch. 
The statute contains a definition "interest holder". §38-9-1(1) provides: 
(1) "Interest holder" means a person who holds or 
possesses a present, lawful property interest in certain real 
property, including an owner, title holder, mortgagee, trustee, 
or beneficial owner. 
Pursuant to the terms of the trust, Allan G. Birch is a beneficial owner of the 
property. He is an "Interest Holder" by definition. 
The trust agreement is attached hereto as Addendum 6. The section of the trust 
that is pertinent here and other points of this brief reads: 
ARTICLE VI 
DISPOSITIVE PROVISIONS AFTER DEATH OF 
SURVIVING SPOUSE 
A. Payment of Expenses. Upon the death of the Surviving 
Spouse, the Trustee shall pay, or reserve sufficient funds 
to pay, all expenses of management and administration of 
the trust estate, including the compensation of the Trustee 
and the attorney, all or any part of which shall be charged, 
in the Trustee's discretion, to income and/or principal of 
the trust estate. The remaining income shall be and is 
hereinafter referred to as "net income." 
B. Distribution of Gifts. The Trustee shall distribute gifts of 
trust property, subject to the provisions of ARTICLE VI 
PARAGRAPH E hereinbelow, to beneficiaries as follows: 
IMPORTANT! DIVISION OF ASSETS/PROPERTY. 
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1. Assets/property of EVA L. MYERS (EVA L. 
BIRCH). The four children of Eva L. Myers (Eva L. Birch), 
to wit: Allan G. Birch, Glenn L. Birch, Jarbes B. Birch and 
Lanny A. Birch, shall share equally shares (25% each) all of 
the following assets/property: 
(1) The Home Residence located at 3598 Blackhawk 
Drive, West Valley City, Salt Lake County, Utah 84120 (the 
"Home"). The Home has a legal description of Lot 83, 
WESTERN ACTRES SUBDIVISION NO, 2, according to 
the official plat thereof, recorded in the office of the County 
Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah. Tax Parcel Number 
15321030140000. 
(2) All accounts such as bank accounts, savings and 
checking accounts, etc. that are in her name only (either 
Myers or Birch) and were in her name before the Trust was 
created." 
The clear import of that section of the trust is that the Blackhawk home would 
remain intact and upon the death of Bernard J. Myers, it w^uld be transferred from trust 
to the Birch brothers. 
What is the nature of their ownership? It is vested subject only to the life estate of 
Bernard J. Myers. The order of the Court allowing Myers to sell the Blackhawk property 
is error. 
The decision of the lower court holding an Notice of Interest to be wrongful lien 
must be reversed and remanded to the district court for compliance with the statute and 
the award of attorneys fees to Birch. 
There is an overriding matter that must be enforced by this Court. Effective on 
May 5, 2008 - §38-9-2 was amended by the legislature, the amendment reads: 
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(l)(a) The provisions of Sections 38-9-1, 38-9-3, 38-9-
4, and 38-9-6 apply to any recording or filing or any rejected 
recording or filing of a lien pursuant to this chapter on or after 
May 5, 1997. 
(b) The provisions of Sections 38-9-1 and 38-9-7 apply 
to all liens of record regardless of the date the lien was 
recorded or filed. 
(c) Notwithstanding Subsections (l)(a) and (b), the 
provisions of this chapter applicable to the filing of a notice 
of interest do not apply to a notice of interest filed before May 
5, 2008. 
The Court will note that the Notice of Interest in this case was filed before May 55 
2008 and therefore the provisions of chapter 9 have no application. Again the matter 
should be remanded to the district court for the imposition of costs and attorneys fees in 
favor of the Birch's. 
POINT II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS THE 
PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF 
BERNARD J. MYERS. 
Following the petition filed by Myers on September 20, 2008, Birch served 
Interrogatories on Myers. One Interrogatory read as follows: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: List separately and in 
detail, each item of property real and personal that you claim 
comprises the probate Estate of Eva L. Myers (Eva L. Birch). 
The answer to Interrogatory No. 5 reads as follows: 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Since no 
personal representative has been appointed as yet and no 
inventory has been prepared for Eva L. Myers' estate, it is 
impossible to completely detail those items of real or personal 
properly that would comprise Eva L. Myers probate estate. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, such property would include 
all of the property described in the Declaration of Intent of 
Bernard J. Myers and Eva L. Myers Revocable Living Trust 
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as being transferred to the Trust which has not been either 
deeded or titled to the Trust or was held outside of the Trust 
in Eva Myers' name or her benefit as of Eva Myers' date of 
death. At this time, subject to further discovery, we believe 
the following assets would constitute part of the probate estate 
of Eva L. Myers: 
1. Scottrade brokerage account No. 17704474. 
2. Life Investors Insurance Annuity. 
3. All furniture and furnishings, jewelry, clothing and 
other personal property located in the home at 3598 
Blackhawk Drive, West Valley C|ty, as of the date 
of death." 
Allan G. Birch, the son of Decedent, filed an Affidavit in this case in Support of 
the Motion to Dismiss. In part this Affidavit stated as follows: 
6. Regarding the property that shQ owned, Affiant 
states: 
a. Scott Trade Brokerage Account. This account was 
owned by Eva L. Myers before she married Bernard J. Myers. 
Shortly before her death, at a time when Eva L. Myers was 
mentally competent, she closed the account and gifted the 
proceeds in the amount of $9,739.01 to Affiant. 
b. Life Insurance Annuity. Affiant is aware that Eva L. 
Myers owned a life insurance annuity prior to her death. 
Affiant was the sole beneficiary of the policy upon her death. 
The proceeds of the policy have been paid to Allan G. Birch 
and divided equally between himself and his two brothers 
(See letter attached hereto as Exhibit "A"). 
c. Real Property at 3598 Blackhawk Drive, West 
Valley City, Salt Lake County, Utah. This residence was 
owned by Eva L. Myers and was fully paid for before her 
marriage to Bernard J. Myers. She deeded this property to a 
trust, established by herself and Bernard J. Myers on the 29th 
day of November, 2005. Following the death of Eva L. 
Myers, Bernard J. Myers purchased a home at 349 East 
Mansfield Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah and is now residing 
there. He has abandoned the Blackhawk property and has no 
intention of returning. My understanding is that the home 
should be conveyed to Affiant and his two brothers from the 
trust. 
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d. Furniture and personal effects. After the death of 
Eva L. Myers, all of her personal effects including jewelry 
and furniture were divided between Affiant and his two 
brothers and Gary Myers and Jane Myers, son of Bernard J. 
Myers and the wife of Gary Myers. What was left, was 
hauled away by Bernard J. Myers and those employed by him. 
e. Savings account. Following the death of Eva L. 
Myers, a savings account that she had in her name at Chase 
Bank, has disappeared. It is believed to be in the possession 
of Gary and Jane Myers, or subject to their control. It is 
believed that is an account that was owned by Eva L. Myers 
prior to her marriage. 
He concluded this statement by stating: 
"Listed above is all the property of Eva L. Myers. Eva L. 
Myers did not own any property at the time of her death that is 
subject to probate and no one is holding property for her benefit." 
The Affidavit was never challenged. 
The Motion to Dismiss was denied by the Court on March 3, 2008. 
On the 29th day of February, 2008, the Motion to Dismiss by Birch was renewed. 
The Court denied the Motion on the 18th day of April, 2008 (R. 681). 
Following the argument on the first Motion to Dismiss the Court denied it without 
prejudice to filing a subsequent motion in the event that Myers did not provide any 
additional information for property or assets to be probated. By the time of trial, Myers 
had not provided any claimed assets other than those set forth in the Answer to 
Interrogatory above. These were satisfactorily explained by Allan Birch in his Affidavit 
has never been challenged. 
A well known legal rule is that a Court will not hear matters or enter orders where 
there is no subject matter. Here there are no assets to be administered. That being the 
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case, the Petition for Appointment of Personal Representative by Bernard J. Myers must 
be dismissed. 
POINT III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ANNULLING THE 
STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES AND ORDER THEREON RELATING TO 
THE SALE OF THE BLACKHAWK PROPERTY AND DISPOSITION OF THE 
PROCEEDS. 
The Court Ordered Mediation in this case (R. 317). The parties contacted Justice 
Gordon Hall to serve as mediator. He agreed to so mediate and the parties met with 
counsel and mediation occurred. However, it was not successful. 
Shortly thereafter, Justice Hall called counsel and suggested he had a way of 
settling this matter to the satisfaction of all parties. He notpd that there were no probate 
assets and the only assets in the case was the Blackhawk property that had been conveyed 
to the trust. He suggested that the property be sold and thq net proceeds be placed in an 
account subject to withdrawal upon the signature of Allan G. Birch and Gary Myers. The 
proceeds could not be used except for the benefit of Bernard J. Myers if he was in need. 
(He is not in need). He receives a minimum from secured pension in the amount of 
$3,261.70 per month (Tr. 261). As consideration for the stipulation, the Birch brothers 
would give up their claim that they were entitled to the Blackhawk property because it 
had been abandoned by Bernard J. Myers. 
This proposal suggested by Justice Hall was stipulated to by all parties and 
stipulated to in open Court and on March 3, 2008 the Court entered an Order as noted 
above approving the stipulation, sale of the home and disposition of proceeds (R. 493). 
The Order was signed on March 3, 2008. 
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However, that was not the end of the matter. On March 13, 2008, attorney 
Matthew Cook filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in this case seeking to overturn the 
Order of the Court relative to the sale of the property and disposition of the proceeds. 
The reason alleged therefore is that there was no joint stipulation concerning the sale of 
the home and the secured bank account. That is not true. At a hearing before the court on 
January 30, 2008 the matter of the mediation and the agreement between counsel was 
recited to the Court. The proceedings relative to this stipulation are set forth in a 
transcript of a motion hearing January 30, 2008 page 7-17. The entire stipulation between 
counsel and the court was embodied in an Order of the Court dated March 3, 2008 (R. 
494). It reads: 
4. The property located at 3598 Blackhawk Drive, 
West Valley City, Salt Lake County, Utah 84120 and more 
particularly described as follows: Lot 83, WESTERN ACRES 
SUBDIVISION NO. 2, according to the official plat thereof, 
recorded in the office of the County Recorder of Salt Lake 
County, Utah and with a Tax Parcel Number of 
15321030140000 shall be sold; and, 
5. The proceeds of the sale described in paragraph 4 
shall be placed in an interest bearing account in the joint 
names of Gary Myers and Allan Birch and distributions from 
such account be made only pursuant to a joint stipulation of 
the parties or further order of the Court for the benefit of 
Bernard Myers. 
The Motion for Summary Judgment seeking a reversal of that Order was to late. 
The motion was mailed to undersigned counsel on the 14th day of March, 2008. The case 
was tried commencing April 1, 2008. There simply was no time to deal with that motion. 
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The case ofYeargin v. Auditing Div. of State Tax, 20 P.3d 287 (Utah 2001), from 
the opinion: 
f 20 A stipulation of fact filed with and accepted by a court 
"acts as an estoppel upon the parties thereto and is conclusive 
of all matters necessarily included in the stipulation." Deseret 
Sav. Bank v. Walker, 78 Utah 241, 252, 2 P.2d 609 (1931). 
Such a stipulation "has all the binding effect of findings of 
fact and conclusions of law made by the court upon the 
evidence." United Factors v. T.C. Assocs., 21 Utah 2d 351, 
354, 445 P.2d 766, 768 (1968). Because the facts stated in a 
stipulation are conclusive, a stipulation of fact "cannot be met 
by evidence tending to show that the facts are otherwise." 
Deseret Sav. Bank, 78 Utah at 252, 2 P.2d at 614. Thus, if the 
stipulation entered into by the parties still stands, the 
Commission and the parties are bound by it and the 
Commission cannot receive any evidence that conflicts with 
the facts contained in it. 
Tf 21 Though "f[t]here is an institutional hesitancy to relieve a 
party from a stipulation negotiated and entered into with the 
advice of counsel,1" Rivera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
2000 UT 36, 1111, 1 P.3d 539 (quoting Birch v. Birch, 771 
P.2d 1114, 1116 (Utah Ct.App.1989)), a court has the 
discretion to set aside a stipulation under certain conditions. 
First, the party seeking relief from the stipulation must request 
it by motion from the trial court. See Fullmer v. Blood, 546 
P.2d 606, 608-09 (Utah 1976) (holding that party was bound 
by stipulation of fact because it did not file motion with trial 
court requesting to be relieved from it); Deseret Sav. Bank, 78 
Utah at 252, 2 P.2d 609 (stating that party must seek 
repudiation through direct proceeding). Second, the motion to 
repudiate the stipulation must be timely filed. See Klein v. 
Klein, 544 P.2d 472, 476 (Utah 1975). Third, it must show 
that the stipulation was "entered into inadvertently or for 
justifiable cause." First of Denver, 600 P.2d at 527 (emphasis 
added). Inadvertence cannot be the basis for repudiation when 
the mistake was "'due to failure to exercise due diligence, [or 
if it could] have been avoided by the exercise of ordinary 
care.'" Rivera, 2000 UT 36 at | 11, 1 P.3d at 542 (citation 
omitted). We have also noted that "[i]t is unlikely that a 
17 
stipulation signed by counsel and filed with the court was 
entered into inadvertently." Dove, 710 P.2d at 170. Fourth, the 
lower court must state its basis for relieving the parties of the 
stipulation. See id. ("In the absence of any articulated 
'justifiable cause,' we must reverse the withdrawal of the 
stipulation." (emphasis added) (quoting First of Denver, 600 
P.2d at 527)). 
Tf 22 In sum, to determine whether the Commission was bound 
to accept the facts as stated in the stipulation, and thus decide 
whether evidence tending to contradict those facts should 
have been excluded, we must determine whether the Division 
filed a timely motion requesting relief from the stipulation, 
and if so, whether the motion was granted based on 
"articulated 'justifiable cause.'" Id. 
The Court Order dated April 21, 2008 is silent as to the reasons it amended it prior 
order based on the stipulation. In short, there is nothing stated that would serve to relieve 
Myers from the Stipulation and nothing found by the Court showing justifiable cause to 
amend the prior stipulation and order based thereon. 
The Order of the Court which in effect destroyed the stipulation arrived at by the 
parties must be reversed. 
POINT IV. BERNARD J. MYERS IS NOT COMPETENT TO SERVE AS 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE. 
We have already noted the evidence produced by Bernard J. Myers relative to his 
competency. However, it must be pointed out that his physician, Margaret F. Lunt, only 
administered a mini mental test which took about 10 minutes. She has practiced medicine 
2
 Although not in the record, undersigned counsel received a letter from Kent Alderman indicating that the property had been sold and the 
proceeds placed in trust. There was nothing stated in the letter as to where the proceeds had been deposited or whether joint signatures were , 
necessary to draw on the account. 
18 
for approximately 9 years and is not a specialist in psychiatry. Her training in that 
specialty was only minimal. 
The evidence preponderates in favor on a ruling that he is incompetent. 
When the petition was filed in this case, Nurse Dee Horn and Social Worker 
Heather Bittinger both filed Affidavits stating that in their opinion after observing 
Bernard J. Myers for a number of times over one month administering hospice care to 
Eva L. Myers, it was their opinion that Bernard J. Myers was incompetent and unable to 
serve as Personal Representative. 
During the trial of this action on April 1, 2008 the Court would not allow either 
Dee Horn or Heather Bittinger to render an opinion in this regard (R. 152, 167). 
Heather Bittinger testified as to the physical and mental ability of Bernard J. Myers 
(Tr. 177 - 191). Her training and experience as a social worker well qualifies her to 
testify as to whether Bernard J. Myers suffered from dementia . The Court, however, on 
objection refused to allow her to render her opinion in this regard. It was therefore 
necessary that her opinion be introduced by way of proffer and this was done. Her 
Affidavit is attached as Addendum 2. 
Mr. Allan G. Birch, son of Eva L. Myers testified (Tr. 28-84). Mr. Birch testified 
to several subjects. The first had to do with the mental capacity of Bernard J. Myers. He 
testified of an instant where Myers received a letter from the IRS which he could not 
understand. The IRS sent a letter involving income tax review and Myers had to bring it 
to Allan Birch because he (Myers) could not understand or contemplate its contents (Tr. 
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38). Myers was unable to render any assistance to Eva L. Myers when she was home 
dying in May, 2007 (Tr. 41). Mrs. Myers was fond of her yard and flowers. Just before 
she died she asked Bernard to water the roses and he said "he wouldn't water the roses for 
an old bitch that was about to kick the bucket" (Tr. 52). 
Just after the death of Eva L. Myers, Bernard J. Myers decided to get his annuity 
money out of Chase Bank. He called Mr. Birch on more than one occasion to express his 
anger. He stated "I'm going to shoot that son of a bitch everyday" (Tr. 60). Myers had a 
quick and uncontrollable temper. Mr. Birch and Myers discussed an issue Myers had 
over a phone bill. Myers was mad and stated "to hell with it, I'll just kill myself. 
He expressed anger over his dealings with Chase Bank over his annuity. He 
complained to Allan Birch and in regards to the banker he said "I'm going to shoot that 
son of a bitch". 
A son of decedent, Glenn L. Birch testified (Tr. 96) that through his many years 
teaching and dealing with people, he gained an understanding in mental capacity (Tr. 
108). On one occasion, when he was at the residence helping to attend to his mother 
when she was dying, Mr. Myers was again talking about his bank account when Myers 
said "I could see why people get a gun and go shoot up the place like that, they get me so 
mad I could take a gun and go shoot em up." Myers would drive to Cokeville several 
times a year to visit with Glenn L. Birch. Glenn testified that on all these occasions, 
Myers could not find his way out of Evanston and they would have to stop and ask for 
help (Tr. 116). One day before Eva L. Myers died the witness was at the Blackhawk 
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property attending to her and had to leave for about an hour and a half, when he came 
back he found both Eva and Bernard in the bathroom tangled with the intravenous tubes 
and wires . Eva needed to go to the bathroom. Myers assisted her but in the process got 
all of the wires mixed and tangled. It was not a difficult task to straighten it out, but 
Myers could not do it. The witness and his brothers rotated 24/7 in taking care of their 
mother from mothers day until she died on the 29th day of May, 2007. Bernard was 
unable to do anything for Eva L. Myers while she was ill (tr. 119). 
Myers had many complaints about the bank and other problems while the witness 
was tending to his mother. 
The witness did observe Myers attempt to offer care to Eva L. Myers, but it was 
ineffectual. (Tr. 200). 
James E. Birch testified that after his mother became gravely ill after mothers day 
2007 he came down on weekends when he could get away from work (Tr. 229). 
Eva L. Myers was getting no care from Benard (Tr. 231). In particular he was 
unable to administer any of the medication Eva L. Myers heeded (Tr. 231-34). 
In the time the witness was there, Myers cursed ab6ut the bank (Chase) and Myers 
hated all of his life in Utah, in particular, the Boys Scouts (Tr. 237). 
One evening while the witness was there with his mother he heard a commotion in 
the other room which sounded like stuff dropping and throwing and cussing "f-ing" that 
g-d this and that". He had heard stories about Myers stating that "they ought to go shoot 
this guy or that guy" so he became concerned and went into the room and Myers said 
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"some s.o.b. has gotten into my g-d paperwork and now I cant find this paper." He was 
livid. When queried, he stated he was looking for some envelope. It didn't take the 
witness more than five minutes to find it. The witness was concerned because Bernard 
was throwing things and he had guns in the room. This concern was for himself and his 
mother. The witness found the paper and Myers calmed down (Tr. 245). 
Bernard J. Myers testified (Tr. 247). Mr. Myers is 91 years of age and resides at 
349 East Mansfield Avenue, South Salt Lake, Utah. That is a residence he purchased 
following the death of Eva L. Myers. He had abandoned the property at Blackhawk Drive 
and never intended to return there. He would prefer to be back in Florida. He considered 
that the Blackhawk property belonged to Eva (Tr. 266). 
Shortly after they were married, they moved to Eva L. Myers home on Blackhawk 
Drive. He always considered that to be her home (Tr. 266-67). 
They kept their money in separate accounts although each account was labeled 
Bernard and Eva Myers Trust. She never got any of his money but he got money from 
her accounts after she died (Tr. 274-77). He testified that she got $20,000 out of his 
account, but in fact it came from her annuity (Tr. 276). 
He did not recall a conversation that the time the trust was entered into in 
November, 2005 about the disposition of his home and her home. Either before or 
following the execution of the trust, Bernard J. Myers home was conveyed to his son 
Gary Myers. He did not recall a conversation at the time of the trust that his home would 
go to Gary and her home would go to her sons. However he did testify as follows: 
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"Q. Do you recall a conversation along that line when 
you and she discussed the fact that Gary would get your home 
and her sons would get her home after -
A. No. I never got into that conversation either. 
Q. No such conversation, you say? 
A. Not that I'm aware of. 
Q. Okay. And following her death -
A. Well, in other words, it could have been a private 
thing when she said to them and there5 d be nothing wrong 
with her saying it. 
Q.Wel l -
A. She didn't have to go telling me that she said it. 
She could say that anytime." 
That testimony is crucial in this case and evidently was not considered by the 
lower court. Myers did not want the house, did not want to live in it. 
Further evidence in this regard is at R. 283: 
"THE WITNESS: And they told me to go to the title 
company on Ninth East and they would - and ask them about 
it. And I went there and the bank had already called them, I 
guess, because as soon as I walked in, they knew who I was. 
And they said, "You own that property." And they said, but 
go to 21 South, the north building, and they got a recording 
office there." 
I went there and they said, "You oivn it but we need 
three death certificates." So they told me Where to go to get 
them. And I came back and gave them to them. And they 
gave one to the tax people and one to the title people, and they 
kept one. And all three of them said I owned the house. 
And I say, "I don't want the house. I don't want to live 
here." 
Testimony given by Mr. Myers although somewhat difficult and confusing makes 
clear to the point that he was not going to live in the Blackhawk property and he didn't 
want it. 
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He did however testify that he had been told that he should sell the Blackhawk 
property and reimburse himself the money he paid for the home. He believed he owned it 
by reason that he was told so by others and also believed he had the right to sell it. His 
thinking was a skewed on that point. The home was in the trust and pursuant to the trust 
the home would be preserved until he died and then transferred to the three sons of Eva L. 
Myers. Nothing had changed. Of course he did not recognize and relied on the 
statements made to him by the title company and the people at the recorders office. Even 
if true, the people he is referring to are not shown to be experts and Myers did not 
produce anyone at trial to prove the hearsay statement. However, when viewed critically, 
and if he is allowed to sale the home, he will receive an unintended advantage. He will 
not only have a new home paid for with his funds, but he will have the proceeds of the 
Blackhawk property sale. No terms of the trust gives him that right. The home was the 
property of Eva L. Myers and fully paid for before she knew Bernard (R. 286). 
He did understand that the trust provided that he and Eva live in the Blackhawk 
property for their joint lives (Tr. 286-290). 
At the very most, the interest of Myers in the Blackhawk property according to the 
trust, is that of a life tenant. Following his death, the property would be transferred to the 
sons of Eva. However, following the death of Eva, he ignored the trust; did not seek legal 
advice and relied on other people to tell him that he owned the property. This was a 
blatant mistake on the part of Myers and on those who were evidently advising him. He 
felt he had a right to reimburse himself from the sale of the Blackhawk property for the 
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home he purchased with his own funds. If sold he would have a new home plus the 
proceeds of the sale of the Blackhawk property. He would be in a vastly improved 
financial situation - not contemplated by the trust. The Blackhawk property must be 
transferred to the three sons of Eva L. Myers now since Bernard has abandoned the 
property and will never return, according to his testimony as quoted above. 
POINT V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO COMPEL 
BERNARD MYERS TO RETURN $7,516.72 THAT HE REMOVED FROM THE 
ACCOUNTS OF EVA L. MYERS AFTER SHE DIED, 
Although the parties formed a trust before Eva L. Myers died with the exception of 
the deed to the Blackhawk residence, the trust was never funded. The parties intended 
and did keep their accounts separate although they appeared to have a trustee designation 
they drew separately on their accounts and neither party attempted to use any of the 
money deposited into the account of the other. However, after Eva died, Bernard 
removed $7,516.72 from the accounts of Eva and spent it (Tr. 296 ). It reads: 
"Q. Okay. Now, what did you do with the money you 
got out of the account? 
A. I guess I spent it. 
Q. For what? 
A. I don't know. Probably graham crackers, for all I 
know." 
He closed the account, but the money was not his to remove and spend. The 
Court did not order him to repay the money and that was error. This Court should compel 
the return of those funds and in the alternative for a judgment in favor of Birch and 
against Myers in the amount of $7,516.72. 
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POINT VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CIVIL 
CASE FILED BY THE BIRCHS AGAINST MYERS AND OTHERS FOR 
VIOLATION OF THE TRUST AND ATTEMPTING TO SELL THE 
BLACKHAWK PROPERTY. 
Shortly after the death of Eva L. Myers, Birch learned that the Blackhawk property 
had been listed for sale. 
As noted in this brief, in part of the trust as noted above, Myers did not have the 
trust authorization to sale that property. 
When the real estate company continued whit its efforts to sell the property after 
notice to cease and desist birch filed a civil suit in third district court against Myers and 
others to enjoin the proposed sale and for damages for breach of trust. Later this case was 
consolidated with the probate case. 
After the parties reached a settlement and stipulation concerning the disposition of 
the Blackhawk property the allegations in the civil suit appeared to moot. However, 
when the court annulled the stipulation and its order following the trial and said nothing 
about the civil trial it merely dismissed the case without notice. The Birch's were 
trapped. The Court took away the stipulation and order without giving any articulable 
reasons and at the same time dismissed the civil case. The Birch's were judicially 
prejudiced. 
CONCLUSION 
The Birch's have stressed the following errors made by the court: 
1. Notice of Interest recorded by Allan G. Birch after Myers had listed the 
Blackhawk property for sale was done to protect his and his brothers beneficial interest in 
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the property. He had a legal right as beneficiary of the trust to do so. The holding of the 
Court that this was a wrongful lien is in error and must be reversed and remanded to the 
lower court to fix attorney fees to be awarded to Birch from Myers. Not to be overlooked 
is the fact that the statute has been amended and "Notice of Interest" is excepted. 
2. The proceedings instigated by Myers regarding the alleged wrongful lien 
require that the petition be signed and an affidavit filed by the record interest holder. The 
mandate in the statute is clear, but in this case the petition was signed by one of the 
lawyers for Bernard J. Myers and never verified. Additionally, the petition was never 
served upon Allan G. Birch. It was mailed to counsel for I^irch, but this does not meet 
the requirements of the statute. 
3. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Court regarding the 
alleged wrongful lien are erroneous and must be reversed and remanded to the lower 
court for the purpose of fixing the Birch attorneys fees. 
4. The lower court erred in finding Bernard J. Myers to be competent and erred in 
failing to allow the testimony of Nurse Horn and Social Worker Bittinger who were 
experienced in this field and had visited with the decedent and Myers several times the 
month before she died. 
5. The lower court erred in dismissing the civil case filed by Birch for damages 
against Myers and others for attempting to sell the Blackhawk property and otherwise 
interfering with the rights of Birch in the trust and in the property. That dismissal must be 
reversed and the case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. 
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6. If the Blackhawk property has been sold, this Court should order an immediate 
accounting by Myers for the proceeds of the sale with the names of the deposited in 
institutions, the amounts withdrawn, together with the documents of sale including the 
closing financial statement. 
7. The lower court erred in not dismissing the Petition for Appointment of 
Personal Representative. There are no probate assets. 
8. The lower court erred in not to compelling Myers to pay to the Birch brothers 
the $7,516.72 he removed from the account of Eva L. Myers following her death or in the 
alternative for judgment in favor of Birch against Myers for that amount. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _2i_ day of October, 2008. 
GARRETT & GARRETTN\ 
By: /CJ^j /p\ jLS^ 
Edward M. Garrett 
Attorney for Appellants 
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-S t . 5 1 " I hereby certify that on this J>\ day of October, 2008,1 caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF THE PLAINTIFF / APPELLANT to be mailed, first 
class, postage prepaid to the following: 
Kent B. Alderman 
Matthew D.Cook 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer 
201 South Main, #1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
W\ 
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ADDENDUM 1 
H U B BISTRJGT COURT 
Third .lurlioial District 
Edward M. Garrett, # 1163 AU6 t 5 2007 
GARRETT & GARRETT SALT LAKE COUNTY , , 
2091 East 1300 South, Suite 201 By__ .^/ 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 D&RUt> <frk 
Telephone: (801) 581-1144 
Facsimile: (801)581-1168 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN A N D OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: ) AFFIDAVIT OF DEE HORN, RN 
) 
EVA L. MYERS, ) 
) 
Deceased. ) PROBATE NO. 073901141 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Dee Horn, being first duly sworn says: 
1. Affiant is a registered nurse having graduated from Southwest College in San Diego, 
California in 1982. 
2. Affiant has 17 years experience in the field of home care and hospice and at present 
employed by Millcreek Home and Hospice Center located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
3. I became acquainted with Eva L. Birch Myers in April or May, 2007. She died on 
May 29, 2007. She had a terminal illness due to cancer. 
4. I visited her at her home on a number of occasions. Also at that time, I conversed 
with and interacted with her husband Benard J. Myers. 
5. During my practice, Yve had occasion to deal with many older persons and I have 
learned through experience to recognize dementia. Mr. Myers is 90 years of age and does have 
dementia. He is not capable of understanding directions given to him concerning the care of Ms. 
Myers and could not comprehend or deal with his ordinary affairs such as banking, 
correspondence and conversation. He could not understand and act on any of the directions 
Affiant gave to him concerning the care of Ms. Birch Myers and the fact that her illness was 
terminal. 
6. In my professional opinion Mr. Myers does not have the mental capacity to serve as 
personal representative of Mrs. Myers estate. He would not be able to understand or act on the 
duties of the office and would not understand the nature and effect of the legal procedures. 
7. He would be unduly influenced by others. 
DATED this ' ^ day of August, 2007. 
Dee Horn, RN 
. A 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to, before me, this J_J_ day of August 2007. 
Residing in: 
My Commission Expires: 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING AND FACSIMILE 
I hereby certify that on this | ^ day of August, 2007,1 caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF DEE HORN, RN to be faxed and mailed, first class, postage 
prepaid to the following: 
Kent B. Alderman 
Matthew D. Cook 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer 
201 South Main, #1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)536-6111 
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ADDENDUM 2 
FILED OISTHIUI CUUft 
Third Judicial District 
EdwardM. Garrett, #1163 . . . . 
GARRETT & GARRETT A U b ' J 200? 
2091 East 1300 South. Suite 201 SALT LAKE couNn j . 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 By_ ^ ^ _ 
Telephone: (801) 581-1144 
Facsimile: (801) 581-1168 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: ) AFFIDAVIT OF HEATHER 
) BITTINGER, CSW 
EVA L. MYERS, ) 
) 
Deceased. ) PROBATE NO. 073901141 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Heather Bittinger, being first duly sworn says: 
1. Affiant is a social worker employed by Millcreek Home and Hospice Center. 
2. Affiant received a master in social science at the University of Utah in 2003. Since 
that date, Affiant has been engaged in the profession of providing social and hospice services. 
Most of the persons I serve are dying of a terminal illness. 
3. Part of my duties and training require me to interact with the families of the 
terminally ill person. 
4. Affiant provided hospice services to Eva L. Birch Myers for approximately 3 weeks 
to one month prior to her death on May 29,2007. Affiant visited in her home on 3 to 4 occasions 
during the month before her death. 
5. During this period of time, I interacted with her husband Benard J. Myers. During the 
period that I have practiced my profession, I've come to recognize, in older people, the signs of 
dementia. Mr. Myers is 90 years of age and does have dementia. He is confused and is unable to 
conduct a conversation or understand factual matters that are presented to him. As an example, I 
could not make him understand that Mrs. Myers was dying and that she would need 24 hour a 
day constant care. It is my professional opinion that a result of Mr. Myers age and dementia that 
he is incapable of understanding normal life situations and does npt have the mental ability to 
conduct any financial transactions or comprehend court proceedings and court documents. 
6. He is incapable of understanding directions given to him and is irrational. 
7. In my professional opinion, he would be unable to perform the duties of personal 
representative of the estate of his deceased wife. 
DATED this J day of August, 2007. 
feather Bittinger, 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to, before me, this ^ day of August 2007 
XP%«r3?% ?'0"(AHV PUBLIC & 
A2Kjty>^<V- E3VVA8D Wi. GARRETT I 
•#7 
SPPTEMBFR 7. ?007 
STMT OF UTAH 
My Commission Expires: 
Notary Public « /) 
Residing in: ^M dlju ^O) l/[td\ 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING AND FACSIMILE 
I hereby certify that on this _[c> day of August, 2007,1 caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF HEATHER BITTINGER, CSW to be faxed and mailed, first 
class, postage prepaid to the following: 
KentB. Alderman 
Matthew D. Cook 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer 
201 South Main, #1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)536-6111 
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ADDENDUM 3 
KENT B. ALDERMAN (0034) 
LAURA S. SCOTT (6649) 
MATTHEW D. COOK (10751) 
PARSONS BEIILE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone. (801)532-1234 
Facsimile: (801)536-6111 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PROBATE DIVISION 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: 
EVA L. MYERS, 
Deceased 
BERNARD J MYERS, as named personal 
repiesentative of the Estate of Eva L Myers and 
Co-Grantor, Trustee and sole Qualified 
Beneficiary of the Bernard J. Myers and Eva L. 
Myers Revocable Living Trust, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
ALLAN G. BIRCH. 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER GRANTING 
BERNARD J. MYERS' PETITION TO 
NULLIFY WRONGFUL LIEN 
Probate No. 073901141 
Judge Robert P Faust 
til Vi !. U t 1 . t ^ l C „• * v
 b 
B;< - J I T ^ — . 
ueouiy »/i«i" 
1017225 2 
JD26437461 
073901141 BIRCH,ALLAN6 
pages: 
1. Petitioner's Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien is hereby granted in its entirety and 
judgment is hereby entered: 
(a) Declaring that the Notice of Interest is a wrongful lien on the Property and 
therefore void ab initio; and 
2. The Notice of Interest is hereby released from the property. 
3. Ptir3-uant~to Utah Code Ann. 38-0 • 4 (2)^Petitioner isu hereby awarded statutory 
tip 
damages,m -the amount of $1000.00: 
4. Pursuant to Utah Code Ami. 38-9-4(2) Petitioner is hereby awarded his attorneys' 
t -r fees and costs, in the amount of 1 tOO >QQ
 t as established by the Affidavit of 
Attorneys' Fees and Costs on Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien submitted to the Court. ****** 
BY THE C 
Honorable Rd^eit B.'FawSt ^ # 
Third Judicial d i i^^ggj j jB^ 
1017225 2 \ir\ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this day of November, 2007, I caused to be served by 
United States mail, postage prepared, a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF 
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER GRANTING BERNARD J. MYERS 
PETITION TO NULLIFY WRONGFUL LIEN, to: 
Edward M. Garrett 
2091 East 1300 South #201 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
^ € i < ^ 
^x. 
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ADDENDUM 4 
~1 
KENT B. ALDERMAN (0034) 
LAURA S. SCOTT (6649) 
MATTHEW D. COOK (10751) 
Parsons Behle & Latimer 
Attorneys for Petitioner Bernard J. Myers 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111 
*»J. 
Third Judicial D^ricY" 
APR 2 ; 2008 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PROBATE DIVISION 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: 
EVA L. MYERS, deceased, 
and 
ALLAN G. BIRCH, GLENN L. BIRCH 
and JAMES BIRCH, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BERNARD J. MYERS, individuaUy and as 
named as Trustee of the Bernard J. Myers 
and Eva L. Myers Revocable Living Trust 
and Does 1-4, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER GRANTING 
BERNARD J. MYERS' PETITION FOR 
APPOINTMENT AS PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE EVA L. 
MYERS ESTATE AND DISMISSAL OF 
COMPLAINT OF ALLAN G. BIRCH, 
GLENN L. BIRCH AND JAMES BHICH 
AGAINST BERNARD J. MYERS, 
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NAMED 
TRUSTEE OF THE BERNARD J. 
MYERS AND EVA L. MYERS 
REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST AND 
DOES 1-4. 
Probate No. 073901141 
Civil Case Np. 070913976 
Judge Robert P. Faust 
17203 001/4850-0830-8482 1 
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The petition for Formal Probate of Will and Formal Appointment of Personal 
Representative under the Will of Eva L. Myers filed by Bernard Myers ("Bernard") and the 
Complaint of Allan G. Birch, Glenn L. Birch and James Birch (the "Birch Brothers") against 
Bernard Myers in his individual capacity and as Trustee of the Bernard J. Myers and Eva L. 
Myers Revocable Living Trust (the "Trust") came on for trial on April 1 and 2, 2008 before the 
Honorable Robert P. Faust. Bernard Myers was represented by Kent Alderman of Parsons Behle 
& Latimer and the Birch Brothers were represented by Edward Garrett of Garrett and Garrett. 
After considering the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits produced, the memorandum 
and pleadings submitted by the parties and hearing arguments of counsel the Court hereby enters 
its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. It was undisputed by the parties to these consolidated actions that the Trust wa~ 
duly executed by Bernard and Eva Myers on November 29,2005^ 
2. There were no facts presented by the parties that there was any invalidity in the 
Trust documents or in its execution. The Trust was prepared with the aid of Bernard and Eva 
Myers5 attorneys. 
3. It was undisputed by the parties that the home located at 3598 Blackhawk Drive, 
West Valley City, Salt Lake County, Utah 84120 (the "Blackhawk Property5*) whose legal 
description is as follows: 
Lot 83 Western Acres Subdivision Number 2 according to the 
official plat thereof recorded in the office of the County Record of 
Salt Lake County, Utah and with a tax parcel of 1532103014000 
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was deeded to the Trust by Warranty Deed signed by Eva L. Myers on November 25, 2005 and 
recorded December 8,2005. 
4. There were no facts or evidence presented indicating that the Warranty Deed was 
invalid. 
5. Bernard's physician Dr. Margaret Lunt, M.D. testified that she had tested 
Bernard's mental capacity and the result of that test was that thfere was no evidence of mental 
impairment. In addition, her experience as his physician over the past nine years indicated that 
he had sufficient understanding and mental capacity to make and communicate responsible 
decisions including the ability to give informed consent, manage his financial affairs, and to 
engage persons to assist him with personal, medical, and legal matters. 
6. The Birch Brothers' claims of an alleged oral agreement between Bernard Myers 
and Eva Myers with respect to the disposition of the Blackhawk Property cannot be established 
due to the requirement of Utah statutes governing the creation of interests in real property be in 
writing and the Statute of Frauds. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Bernard Myers and Eva L. Myers' Revocable Living Trust is a valid and 
existing Trust under Utah law. 
2 The Blackhawk Property is owned by the Trust. 
3. Utah law provides that a "incapacitated person*' means any person who is 
impaired by reason of mental illness, mental deficiency, physical illness or disability, chronic use 
of drugs, chronic intoxication or other cause except minority to the extent of lacking sufficient 
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understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions. The Birch Brothers 
have failed to carry their burden of proof to establish that Bernard Myers is mentally 
incompetent to act as the personal representative of the Eva Myers Probate Estate and to 
continue acting as the Trustee of the Trust. Bernard Myers is not pientally impaired. 
NOW THEREFORE, the Court being fully advised in thfe premises and for good cause 
appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Bernard Myers is hereby appointed as personal representative of the Estate of Eva 
Myers. 
2. Bernard Myers is hereby confirmed as the sole successor Trustee of the Bernard 
Myers and Eva Myers Revocable Living Trust with all of the rights, duties and responsibilities 
inherent in that position. 
3. The Birch Brothers' Complaint against Bernard Myers in his individual and 
Trustee capacity is dismissed with prejudice. 
4. Bernard Myers' Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to the proceeds of 
the sale of the Blackhawk Property is granted and the Court's prior order with respect to payment 
of the proceeds of sale of the Blackhawk Property is hereby amended to reflect that the proceeds 
shall be paid to Bernard Myers as Trustee of the Trust to be administered pursuant to the terms of 
the Trust. 
5. The Birch Brothers' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby denied. 
6. In light of the foregoing order, the Birch Brothers' Motion to Dismiss is moot 
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7. Upon filing of an acceptance of appointment, Letters Testamentary shall be issued 
to Bernard Myers. 
DATED this/_^day of April, 2008 
BY THE COt 
'% 
JUDGE R(teff i^ ; i^{ISTf 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this J^r^t iay of April, 2008,1 caused to be mailed, first class, 
postage prepaid, and by facsimile, a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF 
FACT CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER GRANTING BERNARD J. MYERS' 
PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE EVA L. 
MYERS ESTATE AND DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT OF ALLAN G. BIRCH, GLENN L. 
BIRCH AND JAMES BIRCH AGAINST BERNARD J. MYERS, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS 
NAMED TRUSTEE OF THE BERNARD J. MYERS AND EVA L. MYERS REVOCABLE 
LIVING TRUST AND DOES 1-4, to: 
Edward M. Garrett 
Garrett & Garrett 
2091 East 1300 South, Suite 201 
Salt Lake City, UT 84108 
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ADDENDUM 5 
WHEN RECORDED MAIL TO 
Allan G Biich 
2122 West Lindsay Diive 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
QS'i? OOJ? 07:44 *1 * 1 0 . O G 
Bcc4- - ?3?4 Pg - i-5t 
b A K ' , ' W- O T T 
RECORDED SHLT L-1E C0Uf,TY, UT<H 
2112 tt LINPBH*!8 DF 
xr UTP4i:? 
ffi's ZJn- DEPUTY - " I 1 F. 
NOTICE OF INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY 
The undei signed Allan G Birch, claims and asserts an interest in the follow tract of 
descnbed leal property situate in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, to wit. 
Lot 83. WESTERN ACRES SUBDIVISION NO 2, according to 
the official plat thereof, recorded in the office of the County 
Recorder of Salt Lake County Utah 
Tax Parcel Number 15321030140000 
The interest of Allan G Birch is that of hen and named personal lepresentanve of the 
said Eva L Myeis undei her last will and testament and successor tiustee of the Bemaid J. 
Myeis and Eva L Myers Revocable Living Trust 
DATED this 15th day of August, 2007. 
Allan G Bircl> 
<2? Z J L ^ , / 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County of Salt Lake ) 
ss. 
On the 15 ' day of August, 2007, personally appeared before me, Allan G. Birch, the 
ianmpi nfthf*. fn^.gmng Notice of Interest in Real Property, who duly acknowledged to me that he 
4he s2rriPTARVPUBLIC xne gjfljyg^
 M G A R R E T T 
2091 E 1300 S #201 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84108 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES 
SEPTEMBER ? 2007 
STATE OF UTAH 
• * , D^HJL 
Notary Public 
Residing in _ 
ADDENDUM 6 
TRUST AGREEMENT 
SECTION 3 
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TRUST AGREEMENT 
THIS TRUST AGREEMENT is made this _JZ£__ day of jv^^^he/^ 2005, between 
Bernard J. Myers (a.k.a. "Benny Myers") and Eva L. Myers (a.k.a. "Eva L. Birch"). Husband and 
Wife, of the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, heiein designated as Co-Grantors, and Bernard J. 
Myers and Eva L, Myers, herein designated as Co-Trustees The term "Trustee" shall include Co-
Trustees. 
IT IS AGREED BETWEEN THE PARTIES HERETO AS FOLLOWS: 
ARTICLE I 
TRUST PROPERTY 
A. Original Trust Estate. The Co-Grantors hereby transfer to the Trustee, without consideration 
from the Trustee, the sum of one dollar ($1.00), receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, upon the 
conditions herein provided. 
B. Name of Trust. The name of this Trust is The Bernard J. Myers and Eva L. Myers Revocable 
Living Trust. 
C. Nature of Property. On documents of title, the letters "SPH", "SPW", should they be present, 
shall connote the following: T'SPHM shall connote separate property in the name of the husband; "SPW11 
shall connote separate property in the name of the wife. Such connotations are rebuttable if the facts 
would indicate that ownership is other than as so designated. Should an asset not be designated "SPIT' 
or "SPW," the separate character shall be as reflected in the books aiid records of the Co-Grantors and 
the Trustee. 
D. Additions to Trust Estate. Additional property may be added to the trust estate at any time by the 
Co-Grantors or either of them, or by any person or persons, hy inter vivos or testamentary transfer. 
Such additions and title to any property so added may be, but need not be, evidenced by amendment to 
this agreement or by schedule, deed, assignment, or other writings transferring property to the Trustee. 
All such original and additional property is referred to herein collectively as the "trust estate'' and shall 
be held, managed and distributed as herein provided. An inventory of the property to be initially 
transferred to the Trust Estate is included as "Schedule A" to the attached "Declaration of Intent.5' All 
property initially transferred to the Trust Estate has been, or will be transferred without consideration. 
ARTICLE II 
CO-GRANTORS' RIGHTS DURING JOINT LIFETIMES 
A. Amendment. While both Co-Grantors are living and competent, this Trust may be altered or 
amended by written instrument signed by both Co-Giantors and filed with ihe Trustee. 
B. Revocation. While both Co-Grantors are living, the Co-Grantors, together, may revoke this trust 
in whole or in part and restore to Co-Grantors their respective rights of testamentary disposition by 
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written instrument filed with the Co-Grantors and the Trustee. By way of construction, Co-Grantors 
intend that the character of all property transferred to the trust whi^h has an original source as joint 
property shall remain joint property and shall receive a basis adjustment under Section 1023 of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. Any joint tenancy property owned by the Co-Grantors 
which was originally acquired out of joint property assets and transferred to tins trust shall be 
construed as joint property as defined herein. Separate property sh|all retain its original character as 
separate property. Either Co-Grantor may withdraw his or her separate property without the consent of 
the other Co-Grantor. 
C. Conservatorship or Guardianship, In the event that either Co-Grantor shall be legally declared a 
Conservatee or a Ward of the couit, and the income from the trust shall be insufficient to provide for 
the proper health, support and maintenance of such Co-Grantor, the Conservator or Guardian of such 
Co-Grantor shall have the right with the approval of the appropriate court, to invade the trust for the 
benefit of such Co-Grantor to the extent that such Co-Grantor could have invaded the trust had such 
Co-Grantor not been, at that time, subject to a Conservatorship or Guardianship. The powers of the 
Co-Grantors to revoke or amend this trust are personal to them and shall not be exercisable in their 
behalf by any Conservator or Guardian or other person, except that revocation or amendment may be 
authorized, after notice to the Trustee, by the court that appointed the Conservator or Guardian. 
D. Investment of Trust Estate. While both are living and competent the Co-Grantors may, at any 
time or times, direct the Trustee, in writing, to invest the trust estate in specific securities, properties or 
investments, to retain as part of the trust estate any securities, properties or investments for such length 
of time as such directions may provide, or to sell, encumber, lease, manage, control or dispose of any 
property of the trust estate. The Trustee shall not be liable for any loss sustained or incurred by reason 
of compliance by such Trustee with any such written directions of the Co-Grantors. 
E. Character of Property. Regardless of the location of such property, any personal property 
transferred to this trust shall remain personal property, and any real property transferred to this trust 
shall remain real property. 
ARTICLE III 
IRREVOCABLE PROVISIONS 
A. Irrevocability of Trust B. Upon the death of the first Co-Grantor, hereinafter called the 
"Deceased Spouse," the then surviving Co-Grantor, hereinafter called the "Surviving Spouse," shall 
have the power to amend, revoke and/or terminate TRUST A (the "marital deduction trust*') only, and 
TRUST B (the "exemption equivalent trust"), hereinafter established, may not be amended, revoked or 
terminated. On revocation of TRUST A> all of its assets shall be delivered to the Surviving Spouse. 
Revocation and amendment shall be made by written instrument filed with the Trustee. 
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ARTICLE IV 
DISPOSITIVE PROVISIONS DURING JOINT LIFETIMES 
A. Payment of Expenses. The Trustee shall pay. or reserve sufficient funds to pay, all expenses 
incident to the establishment, management and administration o^ the trust estate, including the 
compensation of the Trustee, all or any part of which may. in the discretion of the Trustee, be charged 
cither to income or principal of the trust estate. The remaining income shall be and is hereinafter 
referred to as "net income.0 
B. Distribution of Income and Principal of Joint Estate. During the joint lifetimes of the Co-
Grantors, the Trustee shall pay to the Co-Grantors, or shall apply for the Co-Giantors1 benefit, the net 
income of the joint estate in quarter-annual or more frequent intervals. If the Trustee considers the net 
income insufficient, the Trustee shall pay to the Co-Grantors, or apply for the benefit of the Co-
Grantors, as much of the principal of the joint estate as is necessary, in the Trustee's discretion, for the 
Co-Grantors' proper health, education, support, maintenance, comfort and welfare, in accordance with 
their accustomed manner of living at the date of this instrument. The|Co-Grantors shall have the same 
duty to use joint income and principal received under this instrument for the benefit of Co-Grantors as 
they have with respect to any other joint property. 
C. Distribution of Income and Principal of Separate Estate. During the joint lifetimes of the Co-
Grantors, the Trustee shall pay to, or apply for the benefit of, the Co-Grantor whose separate property 
was transferred to the trust the net income of that Co-Grantor's separate estate in quarter-annual or 
more frequent intervals. Similarly, if the Trustee considers the net income of the separate property 
insufficient, the Trustee shall pay to. or apply for the benefit of, the Co-Grantor whose separate 
property was transferred to the trust as much of the principal of that Co-Grantor's separate estate as is 
necessary, in the Trustee's discretion, for the proper health, education, support, maintenance, comfort 
and welfare of that Co-Grantor in accordance with his or her accustomed manner of living at the date 
of this Trust instrument. Unless otherwise agreed by the Co-Grantors, separate property shall, for 
these purposes, be treated as the separate property of the spouse Whose labors gave rise to such 
property. 
D. Liberal Exercise of Power of Invasion. The Trustee shall exercise, in a liberal maimer, the power 
to invade principal contained in Subparagraphs B and C of this ARTICLE IV. 
ARTICLE V 
DISPOSITIVE PROVISIONS AETER DEATH OF DECEASED SPOUSE 
A. Division at Death of Deceased Spouse. Upon the death of the Deceased Spouse, the Trustee may, 
if necessary for tax purposes, divide the trust estate, including any additions made to the trust by 
reason of the Deceased Spouse's death, such as from the Deceased Spouse's Will or life insurance 
policies on the Deceased Spouse's life, into two (2) separate trusts, designated as TRUST A and 
TRUST B. The date of allocation may be no later than six (6) months from the date of death of the 
Deceased Spouse. 
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1. TRUST B Assets. The Trustee shall put into TRUST B that amount of the Deceased Spouse's 
interest in the joint and separate properly included in the trust estate, if any, after taking into account 
all allowable deductions and all allowable credits, other than the unified credit against federal estate 
tax, equals the exemption equivalent of the unified credit against federal estate tax, as defined in 
Section 2010 of the Internal Revenue Code of ] 986, as amended, in effect at the date of death of the 
Deceased Spouse. If the Deceased Spouse's said interest in the trust estate is less than such exemption 
equivalent amount, then the Deceased Spouse's entire said interest ^hall be put into TRUST B. The 
assets put into TRUST B shall not be subject to an election to be treaied as qualified tenninable interest 
property and no person shall have any powei to make such an elecuop. 
2. TRUST A Assets. The Trustee shall put into TRUST A the balance, if any, of the Deceased 
Spouse's interest in joint and separate property included in the trust estate: the Surviving Spouse's 
interest in the Co-Grantors' joint estate and the Surviving Spouse's separate estate, if any, included in 
or added to the trust estate in any manner, including any undistributed or accrued income on such 
interest. 
3. Distribution of Assets into Trusts. The Trustee shall designate, in its sole discretion, the assets 
thai shall constitute each trust. The Trustee shall satisfy the amounts determined to be distributed to 
each trust in cash or in kind, or partly in cash and partly in kind, and the assets allocated in kind shall 
be determined to satisfy the amounts on the basis of their value at the date or dates of distribution to 
the respective trusts. The power of the Trustee to make distributions in kind shall include the power to 
make non-pro rata distributions in kind without regard to the income tax basis of assets so distributed. 
However, no allocation of assets shall be made to TRUST A whicji does not qualify for the marital 
deduction. 
4. Vested Interest. Regardless of the date of allocation of assets into TRUST A and TRUST B by 
the Trustee, the interest of the Surviving Spouse in each trust shall be vested immediately upon the 
death of the Deceased Spouse and the Surviving Spouse shall be immediately entitled to such income 
from the trusts, as hereinafter set forth, and may appoint his or her TRUST A share as provided in 
ARTICLE V PARAGRAPH B. 
5. Payment of Debts of Deceased Spouse. On the death of the Deceased Spouse, the Trustee may, 
in the Trustee's discretion, pay, out of the trust, debts of the Deceased Spouse; the estate and 
inheritance taxes, including interest and penalties, arising because of the Deceased Spouse's death; the 
last illness and funeral expenses of the Deceased Spouse, and attorneys1 fees and other costs incurred in 
administering the Deceased Spouse's estate. The Trustee may pay any such taxes directly or. 
alternatively, in the sole discretion of the Trustee, distribute such sums to the Personal Representative 
as shall be necessary to pay ail or any portion of such taxes. Should the Trustee elect to make any 
payments of expenses or debts of the Deceased Spouse, the Trustee may not pay the separate or joint 
debts or expenses of the Deceased Spouse from the separate property of the Surviving Spouse. 
B. TRUST A. 
1. Distribution of Income and Principal During the life ox the Surviving Spouse, the Trusiee 
shall pay io; or apply for the benefit of such Surviving Spouse, ibe enure net income of the trust ir 
quarter-annual or more frequent intervals. Additionally, the Trustee may distribute such portion of the 
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principal of TRUST A, up to and including the whole thereof, as the Trustee deems to be in the best 
interest of the Surviving Spouse. 
2. Appointment Exercisable During Life. During the life of the Surviving Spouse, the Surviving 
Spouse may, by written instrument filed with the Trustee and signed by the Surviving Spouse, direct 
the Trustee to distribute any amount of income and/or piincipal of tRUST A, up to and including the 
whole thereof, to himself or herself, or to his or her estate, his or her creditors, or the creditors of his or 
her estate, or to any other individual designated by such Surviving Spouse. 
3. Appointment Exercisable at Death. Upon the death of the Surviving Spouse, the Trustee shall 
distribute the principal of TRUST A, and any accrued or undistributed net income thereon, to such 
person or persons, including the estate, the creditors, or the creditors of the estate of the Surviving 
Spouse, outright or in trust, or upon such conditions and estates, and with such powers, in such manner 
and at such time or times, as appointed and directed by the last unrevoked written instrument executed 
by the Survivmg Spouse and on file with the Trustee at the date of death of the Surviving Spouse or, if 
no such written instrument exists, as appointed and directed by such Surviving Spouse's Last Will, 
with such Will specifically referring to this power of appointment. Unless the Trustee has actual 
notice of the existence of such a written instrument or Will within ninety (90) days after the death of 
the Surviving Spouse, it shall be deemed, for all purposes hereunder, that such power of appointment 
was not exercised (but the provisions of this paragraph shall not affect any right which an appointee or 
beneficiary in default of appointment ma)' have against any distributee). 
4. Distribution of TRUST A in Lieu of Appointment. To the extent that tire Surviving Spouse 
does not exercise this power of appointment, the principal of TRUST A5 and any accrued or 
undistributed net income thereon, after payment of any estate or inheritance taxes, debts and expenses, 
shall be added to and commingled with TRUST B and shall be held, administered and distributed, in 
whole or in part, as if it had been an original part of TRUST B. 
5. Payment of Expenses of Surviving Spouse's Estate. After the death of the Surviving Spouse, 
the Trustee may, in the sole discretion of the Trustee, pay the estate and inheritance taxes and any 
debts and expenses of the Survivmg Spouse from TRUST A. 
C. TRUSTS. 
1. Distribution of Income. On the death of the Deceased Spouse, the Trustee shall pay to, or apply 
for the benefit of the Surviving Spouse, the net income of TRUST B in quarter-annual or more 
frequent intervals. 
2. Invasion of Principal. 
(a) In the event of any illness affecting the Survivmg Spouse, or if the Surviving Spouse should be in 
need of funds for support in the standard of living to which he or she is accustomed at the date of the 
death of the Deceased Spouse, and if the income of this trust shall be deemed insufficient by the 
Trustee to provide for such reasonable health, support and maintenance as set forth herein, the Trustee 
may, as often as it deems necessary, pay to or apply for the use and benefit of the Surviving S'oovse 
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such part of the principal of TRUST B5 up to and including the whole thereof, as is necessary for such 
reasonable health, support and maintenance. 
(b) Additionally, the Trustee may pay to the Surviving Spouse, such part of the principal of TRUST 
B as the Surviving Spouse shall request m writing fiom lime to time; provided, however, that the 
amount distributed to the Surviving Spouse dunng a calendar year shall not exceed the greater of Five 
Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) or Five Percent (5%) of the value of the trust, and such right of 
withdrawal shall not be cumulative, but shall lapse at the end of each calendar year not so exercised. 
ARTICLE VI 
DISPOSITIVE PROVISIONS AFTER DEATH OF SURVIVING SPOUSE 
A. Payment of Expenses. Upon the death of the Surviving Spouse, the Trustee shall pay, or reserve 
sufficient funds to pay, all expenses of management and administration of the trust estate, including the 
compensation of the Trustee and the attorney, all or any pail of whicjh shall be charged, in the Trustee's 
discretion, to income and/or principal of the trust estate. The remaining income shall be and is 
hereinafter referred to as "net income." 
B. Distribution of Gifts. The Trustee shall distribute gifts of trust property, subject to the provisions 
of ARTICLE VI PARAGRAPH E hereinbelow, to beneficiaries as follows: 
IMPORTANT! DIVISION OF ASSETS/PROPERTY: 
1, Assets/property of EVA L. MYERS (EVA L. BIRCH). The four children of Eva L. 
Myers (Eva L. Birch), to wit: Allan G. Birch, Glenn L, Birch, James B. Birch and Lanny A. 
Birch, shall equally share (25% each) all of the following assets/property: 
(1) The Home Residence located at 3S98 Blackhawk Drive, West Valley Citv, Salt 
Lake County, Utah 84120 (the "Home"). The Home has a legal description of Lot 
83, WESTERN1 ACRES SUBDIVISION NO. 2, according to the official plat 
thereof, recorded in the office of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
Tax Par-eel Number 15321030140000. 
(2) All accounts such as bank accounts, savings and checking accounts, etc. that are in 
her name only (either Myers or Birch) and were in her name before this Trust was 
created. 
2. Assets/property of BERNARD J, MYERS. The one) child of Bernard J. Myers, 
Gary Myers, shall receive 100% of all of the following assets/property: 
(1) All accounts such as bank accounts, savings and checking accounts, etc. that are in 
his name only and were in his name before this Trust was creaiecL 
(all other assets/property are to be divided equally between the five (5) children 
as set forth below in the table in subparagraph Cj 
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If any beneficiary named in this ARTICLE VI PARAGRAPH B is not then living, the gift to such 
deceased beneficial y shall lapse and shall become a portion ofcthe remainder of the trust estate. 
C Distribution of Remainder of Trust Estate. Upon the death of the Surviving Spouse, the Trustee 
shall, after paying or reserving for all amounts payable, as provided in ARTICLE VI PARAGRAPHS 
A and B, divide the lemainder of the trust estate, including the assets of TRUST B and any and all 
property added to TRUST B from TRUST A pursuant to ARTICLE V PARAGRAPH B SECTION 4 
hereinabove, into shares set fonh as follows, and shall hold, administer and distribute each share 
according to the provisions of ARTICLE VI PARAGRAPH E hereinbelow: 
Gary Myers (son) 
Allen G. Birch (sou) 
Glenn L. Birch (son) 
1 James B. Birch (sou) 
| Launy A. Birch (son) 
1/5 of the Trust Estate (20%) i 
1/5 oi the Trust Estate (20%) 
1/5 of the Trust Estate (20%) 
1/5 of the Trust Estate (20%) 
1/5 of the Trust Estate (20%) 
D. Distribution of Deceased Beneficiary's Share. In the event a beneficiary named in 
PAJRAGRAPH C of this ARTICLE VI is not then living, the share of such deceased beneficiary shall 
be distributed to his or her then living issue by right of representation. 
E. Distributions of Income and Principal. 
1. The Trustee may pay to, or apply for the benefit of each beneficiary for whom a trust is then held 
who has not yet attained the age of twenty-one (21) years, as much of the net income of said trust as 
the Trustee shall determine to be in the best interest of and intending to promote the welfare of such 
beneficiary, after taking into consideration, to the extent the Trustee deems advisable, any other 
income or resources of such beneficiary. Any income not distributed shall be accumulated and added 
to and become part of the principal of said trust. After a beneficiary for whom a trust is then held 
attains the age of twenty-one (21) years, the Trustee shall pay to, or apply for the benefit of such 
beneficiary, the net income of said trust in intervals not less frequently than quarter-annually. 
2. If the Trustee deems the net income available hereunder not sufficient to provide for the 
reasonable health, support, maintenance and education of any beneficiary for whom a trust is then held, 
taking into consideration any other income and financial resources of such beneficiary, so far as known 
to the Trustee, the Trustee may, as often as the Trustee deems necessary, pay to, or apply for the use 
and benefit of such beneficiary, such part of the principal of the respective trust of such beneficiary, up 
to and including the whole thereof, as is necessary for the reasonable health, support, maintenance and 
education of such beneficiary. 
3. The Trustee, in its discretion, may make net income or principal payments to a minor or a 
beneficiary under disability by making such payments to the guardian o< conservator of his or her 
person, to a custodian under a Uniform Transfers to Minors Act ox similar staiuie applicable in the 
State of Utah, or to any suitable person with whom he 02 she resides, or the Trustee may aupjv such 
payments directly for the beneficiary's benefit. The Trustee may make net income or principal 
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payments directly to a minor child if, in the Trustee's discretion, such child is of sufficient maturity 10 
manage such distribution. 
4. Upon the death of a beneficiary for whom a trust is then held prior to final distribution to such 
beneficiary, if said decedent is survived by issue, that portion of such trust (including both principal 
and any accrued oi undistributed income) wliich is not exempt fronli the generation-skipping transfer 
tax imposed by Chapter 33 of the Internal Revenue Code of 3986 (or any successor provisions), shall 
be distributed to such issue, including the decedent's estate, and on such terms and conditions, either 
outright or in trust, as the decedent shall have appointed by the last dated instrument delivered to the 
Trustee, including a Will (whether or not admitted to probate), specifically referring to and exercising 
this power of appointment. Any of such portion of the trust as is not appointed, together with that 
portion of the trust that is exempt from the generation-skipping transfer tax, shall be distributed 
according to the terms of ARTICLE VI PARAGRAPH D hereinabove as though said beneficiary had 
predeceased the Surviving Spouse. 
5. There need be no physical segregation or division of the various trust shares except as segregation 
or division may be required by the termination of any of the trusts, but the Trustee shall keep separate 
accounts for the different undivided interests. 
6. Subject to a possible retention of some or all of the assets <|>f the trust estate by the Trustee 
pursuant to ARTICLE VIII PARAGRAPH S, whenever any beneficiary for whom a trust is then held 
shall have attained the age of twenty-five (25) years, the Trustee shall distribute to such beneficiary, 
free of trust, the entire principal and accumulated income, if any, of Ms or her separate trust. 
7. In the event that there shall be no surviving named beneficiaries, including issue as set forth 
herein, the trust shall terminate and the proceeds shall be distributed in one-half (1/2) shares to the 
then-surviving hens at law of each Co-Grantor, as determined by the laws of intestate succession then 
existing in the State of Utah; excluding, however, any provision for distribution to heirs of a 
predeceased spouse. 
8. The term "issue," unless otherwise designated herein, shall include adopted "issue" of descendants 
and lineal descendants, both natural and legally adopted indefinitely. Such term shall specifically 
exclude individuals adopted out of the family of Co-Grantors or out of the family of a descendant of 
Co-Grantors. The word "living" shall include unbom persons in the period of gestation. 
F. Distributions to Incapacitated or Disabled Beneficiary for Special Needs. 
1. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Grantors direct that if any beneficiary hereunder shall, at the time 
for distribution of any part of the trust estate to him or her, suffer from any incapacity or disability, and 
by reason thereof such beneficiary is then receiving, or entitled to receive, any benefits under a 
program of governmental assistance with respect to which the financial condition of the patient is a 
consideration in determining eligibility, the gift to such beneficiary shall lapse and all property that 
would otherwise have been distributable to such beneficiary hereunder shah be held and administered 
by Trustee as a separate trust estate hereunder upon the following tenpas and conditions: 
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(a) The Trustee shall invest and reinvest such separate trust estate, collect the income therefrom, 
and shall pay over and distribute the net income and principal as follows: The Trustee shall, at 
least semi-annually, pay over and distribute all of the net income to, 01 for the benefit of, the 
beneficiary with respect to whom the separate trust estate was created, subject to the 
limitations on the aggregate amount of distributions hcieafier piovided. The Trustee may also, 
from time to time, pay over and distribute to, or for the benefit of such beneficiary, so much of 
the principal of the separate tiust estate as the Tiustee, in the|Trustee's sole discretion, deems 
necessary or advisable to provide for the beneficiary's special needs, after fnst taking into 
consideration all other resources available to the beneficiary, or for the beneficiary's benefit, 
for the payment of such expenses, subject at all times to the limitations on the aggiegate 
amount of distributions hereafter piovided; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that if the existence of 
the Trustee's right to make principal distributions, even as limited herein, would cause the 
beneficiary to be disqualified from eligibility for governmental assistance, then and in such 
eventuality, all principal distributions to, or for the benefit of the beneficiary* shall be 
prohibited. 
(b) The term "special needs" as used herein includes, but is not necessarily limited to necessities 
for the health and welfare of the beneficiary (to the extent the Trustee determines that those 
necessities are not being adequately provided by any program of governmental assistance), 
together with such other training, equipment, care, education, rehabilitation, travel, and 
recreation as the Trustee, in the Trustee's sole discretion, determines to be proper. 
(c) It is the intention of Grantors that the distributions authorized hereby shall supplement any 
program of governmental assistance available to or for the benefit of the beneficiary with 
respect to whom the separate trust estate was created, and the amounts of net income and 
principal distributable by Trustee shall be limited to such amounts as shall not disqualify such 
beneficiary for, or reduce the benefits payable to the beneficiary or for the beneficiary's benefit 
under, any program of governmental assistance otherwise available to the beneficiary or for 
the beneficiary's benefit. Any net income during any accounting period which is not permitted 
to be distributed to the beneficiary by reason of the foregoing limitation shall be accumulated 
and added to the principal of the beneficiary's separate trust estate. 
(d) The Trustee shall continue the administration of such separate trust estate until the death of the 
beneficiary with respect to whom the separate trust estate was created, or until the entire 
separate trust estate shall have been distributed. Any undistributed net income or principal at 
the death of such beneficiary shall be distributed to that beneficiary's issue by right of 
representation. 
ARTICLE Vn 
ADDITIONAL DISPOSITIVE PROVISIONS 
A. Discretionary Termination, If the value of the trust estate or of any segregated share held as 2 
separate trust is determined by the Trustee to be valued at S20.000.00 or less, then such trust zizy. m 
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the discretion of the Trustee, be terminated and the lemainder of such trust shall be distributed to the 
person then entitled to the income therefrom. 
B. Rule Against Perpetuities. Unless sooner terminated in the manner heieinbefore provided, each 
trust shall cease and terminate one day prior to twenty-one (21) years from the death of the Surviving 
Spouse, 01 the death of the survivor of the named beneficiaries who are living at the date of death of 
the Surviving Spouse, whichever death shall last occur, or the interest must vest or terminate within 
ninety (90) years after the interest's creation. Upon such termination, the entire trust estate, including 
principal and any accrued or undistributed net income the)eon, shall be distributed to the persons for 
whom said trust estate is then held, in proportion to the trusts then held for such persons. 
C. Spendthrift Provision. No beneficiary of this trust, other than a Co-Grantor, shall have any right 
to alienate, encumber or hypothecate his/her interest in the trust to claims of his/her cjeditors> or to 
render such interest liable to attachment, execution, or other process of law. The income of this trust 
shall not be pledged, assigned, transferred, sold or accelerated, anticipated or encumbered in any 
maimer whatsoever by any beneficiary, nor shall any income of the trust be, in any maimer, subject or 
liable in the hands of the Trustee for the debts, contracts or encroachments of any beneficiary or be 
subject to any assignments or any other voluntary or involuntary alienation or disposition whatsoever. 
If the creditor of any beneficiary, other than a Co-Grantor, who is entitled to any distributions from a 
trust established under this instrument, attempts, by any means, to subject to the satisfaction of his/her 
claim, such beneficiary's interest in distribution, then notwithstanding any other provision herein, until 
the release of the writ of attachment or garnishment or other process, the distribution set aside for such 
beneficiary shall be disposed of as follows: 
1. Distribution to Beneficiary. The Trustee shall pay to, or apply for the benefit of such 
beneficiary, such sums as the Trustee shall determine to be necessary for the reasonable health, 
education (including study at institutions of higher learning) and support of the beneficiary according 
to his or her accustomed mode of life. 
2. Disposition of Excess. The portion of the distribution that the Trustee shall determine to be in 
excess of the amount necessary for such health, education (including study at institutions of higher 
learning) and support shall, in the Trustee's discretion, either be added to and become principal of the 
trust share of such beneficiary, or be paid to or applied for the benefit of the other beneficiaries then 
entitled to receive payments from any trust established under this instrument in proportion to then-
respective interests in the trust estate; or, if there be no other beneficiaries, the excess income may be 
paid to or applied for the benefit of the person or persons presumptively entitled to the next eventual 
interest, in proportion to their respective interests. 
D. Simultaneous Death. 
L Co-Grantors. In the event that the Co-Grantors shall die simultaneously, or if there is 
insufficient evidence to establish that Co-Grantors died other than simultaneously, it is deemed thai the 
spouse owning the greatei share of the separate property in this trust, or passing into ibis trust due to 
the death of the Co-Grantors, as defined for federal estate tax purposes, shall have predeceased the 
oiher Co-Graiitor, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, and the provisions of this trust 
shall be construed on such assumption. Should there be no separate pioperty either in the t"us; or 
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passing into trust aftei the Co-Grantois' deaths, all property shall pass as though the Wife shall have 
survived. 
2. Surviving Spouse and Beneficiaries. If any beneficiary of the trust, other than a Co-Giantor, 
shall die simultaneously with the Surviving Spouse, or if there is insufficient evidence to establish that 
such beneficiary and the Surviving Spouse died other than simultaneously, it is hereby deemed that the 
Surviving Spouse shall have survived the beneficiary. 
ARTICLE VIII 
TRUSTEE'S POWERS 
In addition to all other powers and discretionary authority granted to or vested in the Trustee by law or 
by this instrument, the Trustee shall have full power to do everything the Trustee deems to be in the 
best interests of the beneficiaries of the trust, including, but not limited to, the following powers and 
discretionary authority: 
A. Power to Retain Trust Property and Comply with Existing Agreements. To continue to hold 
any property received in trust, including undivided interests in Teal property, and to operate any 
property or any business received in trust as long as the Trustee, in the Trustee's discretion, may deem 
advisable, notwithstanding the fact that any or all of the investments retained are of a character or size 
which, but for this express authority, would not be considered proper for the Trustee. In the event 
either Co-Grantor shall be a party to a Buy-Sell Agreement, Crfoss-Purchase Agreement, Stock 
Redemption Agreement, Option or any .agreement providing for the disposition of such Co-Grantofs 
interest in property, whether such agreement has been executed by Co-Grantor individually, or as Co-
Trustee of this Trust Agreement, and which property is owned by the trust, then upon the death of such 
Co-Grantor, the then-acting Trustee of this trust is hereby directed to transfer as much of the Co-
Grantor's interest in such property then held in the trust as is necessary to carry out the provisions of 
any such agreement and to execute all documents and take all further actions necessary or appropriate 
to carry out the terms of such agreement. 
B. Power to Manage Trust Property. To manage, control, sell, convey, exchange, partition, divide, 
subdivide, improve and repair; to grant options and to sell upon deferred payments; to lease for terms 
within or extending beyond the duration of the trust, for any purpose, including exploration for and 
removal of oil, gas and other minerals; to enter into oil, gas and mineral leases, assignments, farm-outs, 
farm-ins and joint ventures; to purchase and sell gas, oil and mineral royalties, to create restrictions, 
easements, and other servitudes; to compromise, arbitrate, or otherwise adjust claims in favor of or 
against the trust; to institute, compromise and defend actions and proceedings; to construct, alter or 
demolish any buildings; and to carry such insurance as the Trustee may deem advisable. 
C. Power to Invest. To invest and reinvest the principal, and to purchase or acquire therewith, every 
kind of property, real or personal, and every kind of investment, specifically including, but not by way 
of limitation, commodities of eve^ nature, corporate obligations o: every kind, precious metals such 
as gold or silver, and stocks, preferred or common, to buy stocks, bonds, commodities and similar 
investments on margin or other leveraged accounts to short sell such accounts, to buy, sell and write 
stock and other security options, to enter into commercial partnership as a partner, limited or general 
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and to operate any business as a sole proprietor. To open, operate and maintain a securities brokerage 
account wherein any securities may be bought and/or sold on margin, and to hypothecate, borrow 
upon, purchase and/or sell existing securities in such account as the Trustee may deem appropriate or 
useful. 
D. Power to Retain Trust Property without Diversification. To retain, without liability for loss or 
depreciation resulting from such retention, original property, real or personal, at any time received by 
the Trustee, for such time as the Trustee shall deem best, even though such property may not be of the 
character prescribed by law or by the terms of this trust for the investment of trust funds, and although 
it may represent a large percentage of the total trust or estate property, and without being required to 
observe the principle of diversification of trust investments. 
E. Power to Retain Unproductive Property. To retain uninvested, all or any pail of the trust estate 
from such time, and from time to time, as the Trustee may deem advisable; provided that unproductive 
property shall not be held as an asset of TRUST A for more than a reasonable time during the life of 
the Surviving Spouse without his or her consent 
F. Power to Borrow. To borrow money for any trust purpose upon such terms and conditions as fee 
Trustee may deem proper, to obligate the trust estate by mortgage, deed of trust, pledge, or otherwise, 
using such procedure to consummate the transaction as the Trustee may deem advisable and to pledge 
the assets of the trust estate to secure the guarantee by the Co-Grantors of the debts of third parties. 
G. Power to Manage Securities. To have, respecting securities, all the rights, pow?ers and privileges 
of an owner, including the power to pay assessments and other sums deemed by the Trustee necessary 
for the protection of the trust estate; to participate in voting trusts, pooling agreements, foreclosures, 
recapitalizations, reorganizations, consolidations, mergers, and liquidations, and in connection 
therewith to deposit securities with and transfer title to, any protective or other committee under such 
terms as the Trustee may deem advisable; to exercise or sell stock subscription or conversion rights, to 
accept and retain as an investment any securities or other property received through the exercise of the 
foregoing powers. 
H. Power to Partition, Allot and Distribute. Upon any division or distribution of the trust estate, to 
partition, allot and distribute the trust estate in undivided interests or in kind, or partly in money and 
partly in kind, at valuations determined by the Trustee, and to sell such property as the Trustee may 
deem necessary to make such divisions or distributions. The power of the Trustee to make 
distributions in kind shall include the power to make non-pro rata distributions in kind without regard 
to the income tax basis of assets so distributed. 
L Power to Determine Principal and Income. Except as otherwise specifically provided in this 
Trust Agreement, the determination of all matters relating to principal and income, and receipts and 
expenses, shall be governed by the provisions of the "Uniform Principal and Income Act" or similar 
statute then applicable in the State of Utah. The Trustee, in the Trustee's discretion, shall determine 
any such matter not provided for either in this Trust instrument or in the Uniform Principal and Income 
Act or similar statute. The Trustee's powers shall be subject to, at any time that a beneficiary shall be a 
Trustee hereunder, the Trustee's duty to treat income and remainder beneficiaries eouitably. 
40 
J. Power to Distribute Income. To make payments, if any, of the net income of the trust in quarterly 
03 moie frequent inteivals as may be convenient to tlie Trustee. Upon the death of the income 
beneficiary of the trust during its continuance, any accumulated income which would have been paid to 
such beneficiary, had he or she survived, shall not be payable to his or her estate but shall be paid to 
bis or her successors or successor-in-interest in the trust as hereinabove provided. 
K. Power to Employ Counsel. To employ counsel and corporate or other agents in the discharge of 
their duties and to pay them reasonable compensation out of either income or principal, in the Tiustee's 
discretion, to rely upon the advice of counsel and to suffer no liability resulting fiom any action taken 
or omitted pursuant to such advice. 
L. Power to Pay Taxes and Expenses Relative to Trust Property. To pay all taxes and 
assessments, including corporate assessments, and other charges levied or accruing against or on 
account of the trust property, and to pay all expenses of the trust, including reasonable compensation to 
the Trustee. To deduct all said taxes, assessments, charges and expenses from the income or principal 
of the trust as the Trustee may deem proper, giving consideration to whether it was income or 
principal, or an allocation between them, which gave rise to such taxe|s> charges and expenses. 
M. Power to Hold Trust Property in the Name of a Nominee. To take title to any property in its 
name as Trustee hereunder, or in its own name or in the name of a nominee, without disclosing the 
trust, or, in the case of securities, to take and keep the securities unregistered and to retain them in such 
manner that title may pass by delivery; or, in the case of real estate, to keep deeds unrecorded; or to 
deposit cash in a checking or savings account without indication of any fiduciary capacity. 
N. Power to Distribute to or for the Benefit of Minor or Disabled Beneficiary, hi any case in 
which a trust share is distributable to a beneficiary who has not reached majority in the state of his or 
her residence, or in any case where mandatory or discretionary payments of income or principal are to 
be made to such a minor or other beneficiary under such legal disability, the Trustee may, in its 
discretion, distribute income or principal directly to the beneficiary, to the guardian or parent of the 
beneficiary, to a bank account in trust, to a custodianship for the beneficiary or to a person with whom 
the beneficiary resides. The receipt of such income or principal by the beneficiary, guardian, parent or 
person discharges the Trustee from its responsibility for the proper expenditure of such income or 
principal. 
O. Power to Pay Taxes. To pay out of the trust shares or income interests giving rise to such taxes, 
all state, federal and local property taxes, income taxes and all other ta^es relating to the trust estate. 
P. Power to Lend. To lend money to any person, including the probate estate of either Co-Grantor, 
provided that any such loan shall be adequately secured and shall bear a reasonable rate of interest. 
Q. Power to Insure. To carry insurance of such kinds and in such amounts as the Trustee deems 
advisable, at the expense of the trust, to protect the trust estate and the Trustee personally against 
hazard or liability. 
R. Power to Commence or Defend Litigation: and to Compromise. To commence or defend, at the 
expense of the trust, such litigation with respect to the trust or any property of the trust estate, as the 
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Trustee may deem advisable, and to compromise or otherwise adjust claims or litigation against or in 
favor of the trust. 
S. Power to Withhold Payment Pursuant to Conflicting Claims. To withhold from distribution, in 
the Trustee's discretion, at the time for distribution of any propeily in this trust, without the payment of 
interest, all or any part of the property, so Jong as the Trustee Ishall determine, in the Trustee's 
discretion, that such property may be subject to conflicting claims, to tax deficiencies, or to liabilities, 
contingent or otherwise, properly incurred in the administration of the trust estate. The Trustee is 
under no obligation to make such retentions and shall incui no liability for the exercise or the failure to 
exercise such discretion. The interests of the beneficiaries hereunder shall be vested legardless of 
whether such assets are so retained, and all income required to be distributed shall be payable to such 
beneficiaries in convenient intervals not less frequently than quarto -annually. Anything else herein to 
the contrary notwithstanding, the Surviving Spouse may cause the disposition of the share in TRUST 
A through the exercise of his or her power of appointment under ARTICLE V PARAGRAPH B 
SECTIONS 2 or 3 of this Trust Agreement. 
T. Power to Adjust for Tax Consequences. To take any action and to make any election, in the 
Trustee's discretion, in order to minimize the tax liabilities of this trust and its beneficiaries or to 
extend the time for payment of any tax liabilities. The Trustee shall allocate the benefits from such 
action or election among the various beneficiaries. The Trustee shall I make adjustments in the rights of 
any beneficiaries, or between the income and principal accountss to compensate for the consequences 
of any tax election, investment or administrative decision that the Trustee believes has had the effect 
of directly or indirectly preferring one beneficiary or group of beneficiaries over others. 
U. Power to Subject Trust Property to Probate. It is the Co-Grantors' intention to avoid probate 
through the use of this Trust Agreement If, however, the Trustee of this trust and the Personal 
Representative of the estate of either Co-Grantor shall mutually determine that it shall be in the best 
interests of the beneficiaries of the trust, and the beneficial interests of the beneficiaries shall not 
thereby be altered, the Trustee may subject any asset to probate to accomplish a result unavailable 
without probate. This power shall be strictly construed and shall ofaly be used to secure any tax or 
other benefit otherwise unavailable to the trust 
V. Power to Delegate. To perform or to delegate to any trustee or non-trustee, any non-discretionary 
power, including the power to singularly or jointly open, close or transfer any type of bank account or 
savings and loan association account, sign checks, drafts, withdrawal slips or other documents, give 
-instructions for the receipt or delivery of securities or other property, give instructions for the paymtdt 
or the receipt of money and. singularly or with others, have access to any safe deposit box or other 
place containing property of this trust 
ARTICLE IX 
LIMITATION OF POWERS 
A. Management of Principal and Income. No powers, enumerate^ herein or accorded to a Trustee 
generally by law, shall be construed to enable any person appointed) as Trustee or otherwise, o: any 
other person, to purchase, exchange or otherwise deal with or dispose of the principal or income of this 
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trust for less than adequate consideration in money or money's worth or to enable any person appointed 
as Trustee or otherwise to borrow the principal or income of this trust, directly or indirectly, without 
adequate interest or security. This limitation shall not apply to a Co-Grantor acting as Co-Trustee or 
sole Trustee, nor shall it apply to a Co-Grantor who is the Surviving Spouse and is serving as Trustee 
of TRUST A after the death of the Deceased Spouse. 
B. Fiduciary Capacity of Trustee. Any Trustee or Co-Trustee of ah irrevocable trust hereunder shall 
act in his or her fiduciary capacity at all times and shall treat the income and remainder beneficiaries 
equitably, and no Trustee shall have any power that would cause includibility of such irrevocable trust 
share in his or her estate for federal estaie tax purposes. Should any condition arise, including a 
change in the law, that would prevent any such Trustee or Co-Trustee of such irrevocable trust, from 
acting as Trustee hereunder, without causing includibility of such trust share in his or her estate for 
federal estate tax purposes merely by reason of such trusteeship, such Trustee or Co-Trustee shall 
resign, and the next Successor Trustee, as designated herein, who shall not be subject to such 
includibility shall be appointed in his or her stead. 
C. Invasion of Principal by Trustee. No Trustee or Co-Trustee, who is also a beneficiary of an 
irrevocable trust share hereunder* shall have the power to invade the trust principal for his or her 
benefit prior to the termination of the trust except pursuant to the ascertainable standards set forth in 
this Trust Agreement, 
D. Trustee's Power over Joint Property. The Trustee shall have no more extensive power over any 
joint property transferred to the trust than either of the Co-Grantors would have had, according to the 
laws of the State of Utah, had this trust not been created, and this instrument shall be so inteipreted to 
achieve this intention. This limitation shall terminate upon the death pf either Co-Grantor. 
ARTICLE X 
RECORDS AND ACCOUNTING 
The Trustee shall keep and maintain adequate books and records reflecting all income and principal 
transactions, which books and records shall be open at all reasonable times to the inspection of the Co-
Grantors and to their duly authorized representatives. The Trustee shall furnish at least annual 
statements for all transactions to the then-income beneficiaries of th£ trust or to the natural or legal 
guardians of such beneficiaries. 
ARTICLE XI 
COMPENSATION OF TRUSTEE 
The Trustee shall receive as compensation for its services, unless waived, such commissions as are 
customarily being charged by commercial trust companies for services as a trustee of an inter vivos 
trust in the State of Utah. 
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ARTICLE XII 
TRUSTEES AND SUCCESSORS 
A. Co-Grantors as Trustees and Successors. Upon the death, resignation or incapacity of either 
Bernard J. Myers or Eva L. Myers as Trustee, the Successor Trustee shall be the survivor of them. 
Upon the death, resignation oi incapacity of both Bernard J. Myers and Eva L* Myers, the Successor 
Trustee shall be Allan G. Birch and Gary Myers, acting jointly. 
B. Towers and Responsibility of Successor Trustee. Upon the appointment of any Successor 
Trustee, such Trustee shall not be required to conduct an audit or account of the fiducial^ conduct of 
any previous Trustee and shall incur no liability whatsoever by its failure to examine the prior trust 
record. Every Successor Trustee shall have all the poweis given the originally named Trustee. No 
Successor Trustee shall be personally liable for any act or omission of any predecessor Trustee. 
C. Guardianship or Conservatorship of Trustee. The establishment of a Guardianship or 
Conservatorship of the Trustee, whether it is of the Estate or the Person, shall cause the trusteeship of 
such individual to terminate and to pass to the Successor Trustee. Additionally, should two physicians, 
neither of whom is a beneficiary hereunder, related to either Co-Grantor or to the Trustee within the 
second degree, nor related to any beneficiary of this Trust or beneficiary under the Will of either Co-
Grantor within the second degree, certify that the Trustee is incompetent to act as Trustee, such 
trusteeship shall terminate and pass to the Successor Trustee upon notification of such certification to 
the Co-Grantors, or the surviving Co-Grantor, to the Trustee, and to each then-income beneficiary. 
Should any Co-Grantor, Trustee or income beneficiary object to such certification, such objecting 
party may seek a legal determination of incompetence in any court of competent jurisdiction. 
D. Resignation of Trustee. Any Trustee or Co-Trustee of this Trust Agreement may resign as 
Trustee after written notice of such resignation is delivered to the Co-Grantors, or to the surviving Co-
Grantor, or, if both Co-Grantors are deceased, to all of the beneficiaries then receiving income 
interests, and upon the acceptance of the Successor Trustee to act. The resignation of a Trustee can be 
effected by the attorney-in-fact for a Trustee, exercising such power pursuant to a valid power of 
attorney. The resigned Trustee shall deliver an accounting of the assets, income, and expenses to the 
Successor Trustee as soon thereafter as is reasonably practical. 
E. Removal of Trustee. The Co-Grantors shall have full power and authority and. after the death of 
either Co-Grantor, the surviving Co-Grantor shall have full power and authority, at any time, to 
remove the Trustee hereunder and to appoint a Successor Trustee, including any corporation or 
banking institution, and shall do so by delivering to the Trustee to be removed, a written notice of such 
removal, a written appointment of the Successor Trustee, and a written acceptance by the Successor 
Trustee. Upon delivery of such instruments to the Trustee, said Trustee shall, after deducting ail 
charges and amounts due it as Trustee, and upon receipt of such proper indemnity as it may require, 
transfer and deliver the trust estate to the Successor Trustee. Thereafter, said removed Trustee shall 
have no further powers, discretion's, rights, obligations or duties with reference to the trust, anc all 
such powers, discretionary authority, rights, obligations or duties given the Trustee by this Tiusi 
instrument shall inure to and be binding upon said Successor Trustee After the death of either Co 
Granior, the surviving Co-Grantor shall have full power and authority to alter the succession of 
44 
trustees, as provided heiein, by written "Designation of Successor Trusiee(s)'5 filed with the then-
acting Trustee. 
F. Delegation of Power to Co-Trust ec(s) and Other Agents. Any acting Co-Trustee may, from time 
to time, delegate to one or more of the remaining acting Co-Trustees, any powers, duties or 
discretionary authority. Any such delegation shall be in writing, delivered to the delegate or delegates 
and shall remain in effect for the period of time specified in such written delegation or until earlier 
revocation in writing is delivered to such delegate or delegates. The certification of any Trustee, as to 
the name and authority of any Trustee acting by reason of delegation or otherwise, shall be sufficient 
evidence of authority and shall indemnify any person relying upon such certification. Additionally a 
Co-Grantor acting as a Trustee may, by the execution of a Power of Attorney, delegate to a third party, 
the power and authority to act for such Co-Grantor in his or her capacity as a Trustee in any way in 
which said Trustee could act if personally present and able to act, subject to the provisions and any 
limitations set forth in such executed Power of Attorney, 
G. Required Consent of Co-Trustees. Subject to the provisions of ARTICLE XII PARAGRAPH F, 
whenever there are more than two (2) acting Co-Trustees, a majority of such Co-Trustees, whether 
individual or corporate, shall have the power to make any decision, undertake any action or execute 
any documents affecting the trusts created herein, and the dissenting Co-Trustee or Co-Trustees shall 
thereupon be released from all liability resulting from the decision of the majority. If there are two (2) 
acting Co-Trustees, they must act unanimously. If an individual Co-Trustee and a corporate Co-
Trustee are acting, the decision of the individual Co-Trustee shall be binding. 
H. Vacancy in Trusteeship. If all the named Trustees and Successor Trustees die. resign, or become 
incapacitated, and in the event that the right to appoint or designate a Successor Trustee is not 
exercised by the Co-Grantors or by the surviving Co-Grantor as provided in ARTICLE XII 
PARAGRAPH E hereinabove, then the Successor Trustee shall be chosen by a majority-in-interest of 
the-then living beneficiaries, with a parent or guardian voting for each minor beneficiary. 
L Foreign Assets. In the event that the trust shall own real property in some state other than Utah 
(hereinafter referred to as "Foreign Assets1') and the Trustee hereunder shall be a corporate or 
individual Trustee not authorized to do business in that state, such corporate or individual Trustee shall 
select an individual "Ancillary Trustee" located anywhere within the United States of America, 
providing such individual Ancillary Trustee shall be legally able to act in such state, or a corporate 
Ancillary Trustee located within the state of situs of such real property, and such Ancillary Trustee 
shall be vested with, and only with, title to and management of, each Foreign Asset and such Ancillary 
Trustee shall have the same rights and powers over the real property within such state as the regularly 
appointed Trustee under this trust would have had it been able to act as Trustee within that state. The 
Ancillary Trustee shall pay over to the Trustee hereunder, at least annually, the net income attributable 
to such Foreign Assets. The Trustee selecting such Ancillary Trustee shall be held harmless for any 
wrongdoing on the part of the Ancillary Trustee that it shall select. No individual Ancillary7 Trustee 
maybe selected who would, merely through selection as such Ancillary Trustee, be subject to estate or 
inheritance tax on any trust assets upon Ins or her death. 
45 
CERTIFICATION 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT: 
1. We have read the foregoing Trust Agreement; 
2. The foregoing Trust Agreement correctly states the terms and conditions under which the Trust 
Estate is to be held, managed, administered and disposed of by the Trustee, 
3. We approve such Trust Agreement in all particulars; 
4. As the Trustee named in such Trust Agreement, we approve and accept the Trusts provided for in 
such Agreement; and5 
5. The Co-Grantors are executing this Agreement. The Co-Grantors shall retain this original 
Agreement for their records. An electronic copy of tins agreement shall be retained by Lundell & 
Lofgren, P.C., Attorneys At Law, 136 South Main, Suite A-200, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Bernard J. Myers and Eva L. Myers, Co-Grantors, and Bernard J. 
Myers and Eva L. Myers, as Co-Trustees, as evidence of acceptance of the responsibilities of a 
Trustee hereunder, have signed this Trust Agreement. 
CO-GRANTORS: 
?/Ui 
CO-TRUSTEES: 
B&fnard J. M y e r s ^ S ^ \ 
Eva L. Myers 
^ ^ )&AhX__. J^ 
Eva L. Myers 
'<?sS,i £<L^ 
End of the Certification of Trust Agreement 
for 
The Bernard X Myers and Eva L, Myers 
Revocable Living Trust 
48 
